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INTRODUCTION
Laura Lale Kabis-Kechrid
Similar to many other countries in the region, violent 
extremist groups and ideologies pose a significant 
threat to Moroccan society and the stability of the 
country. In response, the government has pursued a 
highly security-based approach, which has resulted 
in the arrest of over 3,000 (alleged) jihadis and the 
dismantling of 186 terrorist cells between 2002 and 
2018. While the root causes are multi- faceted, Moroc-
co’s ongoing socio-economic challenges, which have 
reinforced economic and political grievances, have 
fueled radicalization. For this reason, some have 
demanded that the government prioritize greater 
domestic engagement instead of increasing invest-
ment in countries south of the Sahara. Over the past 
years, Morocco has reoriented its regional foreign 
policy and accelerated its economic integration with 
Sub-Saharan Africa. In its efforts to champion itself 
as a regional leader and geostrategic hub, Morocco 
has not only increased its economic and diplomatic 
ties with its southern neighbors, but has also used its 
new migration policy as a soft diplomacy tool.
This edited volume brings together papers written 
by participants in the workshop series “Promotion of 
Think Tank Work on Violent Extremism in Morocco 
as well as Morocco’s Regional Policy in Sub-Sa-
hara Africa and the MENA Region,” held in Berlin in 
December 2018 and Rabat in March 2019. The work-
shop was conducted as part of DGAP’s project on 
strengthening think tanks and similar institutions in 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and 
Europe. The authors analyze key aspects and chal-
lenges of Morocco’s strategy to prevent and counter 
violent extremism (P/CVE), and assess the differ-
ent facets and implications of its regional policy in 
Sub-Sahara Africa and the MENA region. The volume 
offers recommendations for the Moroccan govern-
ment as well as the EU and its member states.
Among the recommendations are the following: the 
Moroccan government should develop a more holis-
tic approach to prevent and counter violent extrem-
ism that involves and empowers a broader range of 
actors. Measures should place greater emphasis on 
addressing the root causes of violent extremism and 
reintegration programs. More research should be 
conducted in order to better understand different 
drivers of radicalization and to develop tailor-made 
programs. In addition, religious associations and 
scholars should be trained to enhance their ability to 
counter extremist narratives. Overall, a better coor-
dination between the various stakeholders is con-
sidered crucial in order to synergize their activities. 
While the potential of women as actors in P/CVE is 
increasingly recognized by the Moroccan state, their 
involvement should be expanded to penetrate all lev-
els of P/CVE activities rather than being confined to 
a gendered approach.
In addition to targeted P/CVE programs, targeted 
policies to support socio-economic development 
would be essential to tackle radicalization. In this 
context, Morocco’s increasing economic cooperation 
with Sub-Saharan African countries could offer new 
opportunities. In order to alleviate concerns among 
politicians and private sector groups in some of those 
countries regarding the possible negative impact of 
Morocco’s integration into the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) on their domestic 
economies, the Moroccan government and its part-
ner countries should engage more closely with pri-
vate sector representatives.
Greater cooperation between Morocco and its south-
ern neighbors could also benefit the EU and its mem-
ber states. Expanding its cooperation with Morocco 
could allow the EU easier access to African markets. 
In addition, Morocco’s “soft” security approach, 
which relies on the religious authority of the King 
and Morocco’s Sufi tradition, to help Sub-Saharan 
African countries in the fight against extremist ideol-
ogies, could support the EU’s own security efforts in 
the region. Hence, the EU should adjust its assistance 
to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 
to encourage a more comprehensive “soft” security 
cooperation between Morocco and Sub-Saharan 
African countries. At the same time, the EU should 
ensure that safeguards are put in place to make sure 
that the possible authoritarian side-effects of Moroc-
co’s strategy are kept in check.
The Contributions in Short
Chapter I: Violent Extremism and Preventing/
Countering Violent Extremism Strategies in 
Morocco
“Morocco’s Female Islamic State Migrants – A 
Neglected Aspect of the Foreign Fighter Problem”: Lisa 
Watanabe draws attention to the fact that the driv-
ers of female migration to the Islamic State as well as 
the specific challenges related to their return remain 
understudied. She argues that more gender-con-
scious research is needed to enhance understanding 
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of the dynamics and to develop counter-narratives, 
as well as de-radicalization and reintegration pro-
grams for female returnees.
“Promoting the Agency of Women in Preventing and 
Countering Violent Extremism in Morocco”: Assess-
ing the inclusion of women in P/CVE strategies in 
Morocco, Clarisse Anceau advocates for granting 
women a more prominent role in such programs and 
enhancing women’s agency. To this end, women in 
areas particularly affected by radicalization should 
be involved in the design and implementation of P/
CVE programs. In addition, greater support should be 
extended to women’s organizations and cooperation 
with these actors should be increased.
“Morocco’s Murshidat as Actors in Counter-Radical-
ization Policies”: Meriem El Haitami discusses the role 
of female religious leaders (murshidat) in Morocco’s 
strategy to counter and prevent violent extremism. 
While she highlights the contribution of murshidats 
to the state’s C/PVE approach, she warns against a 
gendered approach and emphasizes that the role of 
women should not only focus on prevention efforts. 
Rather, women should also be included in recon-
struction and peacebuilding processes. Privileging 
the practice of independent reasoning (ijtihad) could 
allow murshidats to play an important role in advanc-
ing a more tolerant interpretation of Islam.
“Official Islam’s Involvement in Preventing Violent 
Extremism – Critical Insights from Morocco”: Salim 
Hmimnat analyses the role of Morocco’s religious 
bureaucracy in the state’s strategy to prevent violent 
extremism. He argues that the creation of an inter-
governmental body could facilitate better coordina-
tion of activities between different institutions and 
create new synergies. In addition, providing training 
for religious associations and scholars as well as eval-
uating the impact of activities based on assessment 
indicators could increase the effectiveness of Moroc-
co’s PVE efforts.
“Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism – The 
Role of Local Community Broadcasting”: Drawing on 
best practice examples of community radio programs 
in Morocco, Hamdi Echkaou emphasizes the impor-
tance and ability of community radio broadcasting to 
address social issues and positively serve communi-
ties by focusing on their particular needs. He advo-
cates for the use of community radio broadcasting to 
prevent violent extremism. Such an approach would 
need to engender new attitudes of interaction that 
adapt to the nature of the topics aired and the com-
munity being targeted.
Chapter II: Morocco’s Regional Policy and Impli-
cations for EU-Morocco Relations
“Streamlining Moroccan ‘Soft’ Security in Sub-Sa-
haran Africa – Inclusion is Key”: Žilvinas Švedkaus-
kas analyses the use of Sufism and Sufi networks in 
Morocco’s foreign policy strategy vis-à-vis Sub-Saha-
ran Africa. He cautions that despite the international 
recognition for Morocco’s “soft” security approach, 
the authoritarian side-effects of Rabat’s efforts to 
transpose its approach southwards should not be 
overlooked. For this reason, the European Union 
and its member states should formulate a strategy 
that acknowledges the merits of Morocco’s regional 
engagement, while ensuring that safeguards against 
authoritarian exploitation exist.
“Rethinking the Economics of Morocco’s Regional Pol-
icy”: Abdelouahed Eloufir assesses the economics of 
Morocco’s new regional policy, which has seen a shift 
towards increasing engagement with Sub-Saharan 
African countries. According to the author, Morocco 
and its Sub-Saharan African partner countries should 
engage more proactively with private sector repre-
sentatives, who have voiced concern over Moroc-
co’s integration into ECOWAS. In addition, European 
and African businesses could benefit from positive 
economic spillover effects if cooperation between 
Morocco and Algeria improved. Consequently, the 
EU and the African Union should increase efforts to 
mediate between the two sides and support regional 
economic integration.
“Morocco’s South-South Cooperation Strategies – An 
Advantage for Existing North-South Partnerships”: 
Ingrid Heidlmayr-Chegdaly argues that Morocco’s 
growing engagement with its southern neighborhood 
presents an opportunity for European decision-mak-
ers. Morocco’s strategic position and relations with 
Sub-Saharan African countries could benefit the 
EU’s own Africa policy. Expanding cooperation with 
Morocco could improve the accessibility of Afri-
can markets for the EU. At the same time, Morocco 
should use its own economic and political institu-
tions in a more targeted way to better advance its 
agenda with the EU.
“Morocco’s Migration Policy at Stake – Between For-
eign Policy Gains and Human Rights Costs”: Tachfine 
Baida analyses the new Moroccan migration pol-
icy, which was adopted in the aftermath of the Arab 
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Uprisings of 2011. He argues that while the policy has 
helped Morocco’s international image, it has only 
had limited success in facilitating the integration of 
migrants at home and protecting their rights. For this 
reason, an adjustment of the policy is needed. This 
includes the introduction of measures that protect 
migrants from violence, the adoption of a migration 
and asylum law in line with human rights standards, 
and an increase in funds for integration and protec-
tion programs.
Chapter I: Violent 
 Extremism and Preven-
ting/Countering Violent 
Extremism Strategies in 
 Morocco
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MOROCCO’S FEMALE ISLAMIC 
STATE MIGRANTS – A NEGLECTED 
ASPECT OF THE FOREIGN FIGHTER 
PROBLEM
Lisa Watanabe
Moroccan women were heavily represented amongst 
female migrants to the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and 
Iraq. Yet, the focus so far has tended to be on male 
foreign fighters from Morocco and their return. Com-
paratively little is understood about the motivations 
of women who migrated to IS-held territories in the 
Levant or the challenges related to their return. Gain-
ing a better understanding of this group of IS migrants 
will be critical to developing effective measures aimed 
at preventing radicalization of women and girls in 
Morocco, as well as ensuring that female returnees do 
not contribute to bringing up the next generation of 
IS militants. Gender-conscious research and analysis, 
counter-narratives informed by female-specific driv-
ers of radicalization, and de-radicalization and rein-
tegration programs for female returnees are urgently 
needed.
Comparatively little attention has been paid to 
female radicalization and migration to Islamic State 
(IS)-held territories, perhaps because women are 
often not directly involved in jihadist violence, and 
have travelled in smaller numbers to Syria and Iraq, 
and beyond. Yet, female IS militants are not a homo-
geneous group. While many have followed their hus-
bands and adopted supportive roles, including car-
ing for their husbands and families, some have taken 
up active roles after migrating to IS-held territories, 
including perpetrating attacks. This risk associated 
with those who have had active roles will be espe-
cially elevated. However, even some of those women 
who have not been actively involved in attacks could 
play a key role in transmitting the ideology and 
 legacy of IS to their children.1 Female IS migrants, 
thus, deserve greater attention.
Moroccan women were among the five largest 
national cohorts of women to have travelled to 
Syria and Iraq.2 Of just over 1,600 Moroccan  ji hadist 
migrants to Syria and Iraq, some 300 were  women.3 
Some of these women have already returned to 
1 Joana Cook and Gina Vale, “From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State,” ICRS, 2018, p. 7.
2 Ibid., p. 22.
3 Ibid., p. 16.
4 Interview with Bahija Jamal, Public law Department, Hassan II University, Aïn Chock, Casablanca, Morocco, November 5, 2018.
5 Nabila Hamza, “Femmes djihadistes: victimes ou ‘impossibles coupables’,” in Fatima Sadiqi and Helmut Reifeld (eds), “Women and Resistance to 
Radicalisation,” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and Centre ISIS pour Femmes et Développement, 2017, pp. 46-9; Cook and Vale, “From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’,” p. 23.
6 Cook and Vale, ibid., p. 26.
Morocco, while others are being detained abroad 
in the hope of one day returning home.4 Moroccan 
authorities not only face the challenge of preventing 
further radicalization of women and girls, but also 
of minimizing the risks related to female returnees. 
At present, there is a gap in the knowledge about 
female-specific drivers of radicalization in Morocco, 
as well as insufficient measures aimed at prevent-
ing female radicalization and ensuring that female 
returnees successfully (re)integrate into society. As 
long as this is the case, Morocco could experience 
more terrorist activities perpetrated by or involving 
women.
Female Migrants to IS Territories
Studies have shown that in general no one profile 
of female migrants to IS territories in Iraq and Syria 
fits all. However, several factors do stand out. Female 
migrants have tended to be younger than their male 
counterparts, on average 21, compared to an average 
age of 25 for male jihadist migrants. Some were even 
teenagers. Their level of education is variable, though 
many have tended to have a fairly basic knowledge 
of Islam. Social media and the internet appear to 
be the principle means by which females have been 
recruited and radicalized.5
The motivations of female migrants, linked to factors 
that have contributed to their marginalization within 
society (“push factors”) and those that have attracted 
them to IS (“pull factors”), have been shown to vary. 
This suggests that there is no one pathway to radical-
ization and violent extremism. Even so, it is possible 
to identify drivers that are common to many individ-
uals. Studies of female radicalization have identified a 
number of such factors. These include the search for 
belonging and identity, the idea of the caliphate as a 
place where pious women are respected, the percep-
tion that the community of Muslims (Umma) is under 
threat, the desire to be part of a utopian and divine 
project, to live under sharia law, as well as the desire 
for adventure and the prospect of marriage.6
Although women who have travelled to IS-held terri-
tories in Iraq and Syria are often portrayed as “jihadi 
brides”, this does not accurately capture the reality 
of this diverse group of women. In fact, female IS 
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migrants have had a variety of roles. While it is true 
that these roles were largely limited to being wives 
and mothers, with responsibility for raising their 
children according to IS ideology, women have also 
been active in the recruitment of other women. In 
addition, they have held positions within education, 
media services, healthcare, moral policing, and tax 
collection.7 Reports have also emerged of women 
taking up more operational roles, including as sui-
cide bombers as the Caliphate fell in 2017.8 Female 
migrants to IS-held territories are, thus, a heteroge-
neous group, whose activities and experiences differ 
considerably.
The Moroccan Contingent
Due to the lack of attention Moroccan female IS 
migrants have received so far, information regarding 
their profiles is sparse. At present, researchers do not 
have access to variables such as the geographic areas 
from which they hail, their social backgrounds, or 
their level of education, for example. Nevertheless, a 
number of characteristics can be discerned. Although 
the exact age range of female IS migrants is not pub-
lic knowledge, IS recruiters in Morocco are known 
to have targeted young women, particularly minors.9 
They are also not believed to come from especially 
religious families,10 which suggests that their level of 
religious education may not be very high, as is the 
case more generally.
In line with what is occurring elsewhere in the world, 
recruitment for travel to IS-held territories in Iraq 
and Syria has tended to take place in the private 
sphere, via social media and the internet, invariably 
by other women. Some has, nevertheless, taken place 
face-to-face in places such as mosques and ham-
mams. Recruitment cells, at least in some cases, have 
been transnational, spanning Moroccan and Spanish 
territories. In 2014, transnational networks operating 
out of Fnideq and Sebta in northern Morocco and 
in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, where 
IS recruitment in Spain is particularly pronounced, 
were discovered, for instance.11
7 James Rothwell, “Morocco Arrests Ten Female Isil Suicide Bombers Who ‘Planned to Strike on Election Day’,” The Telegraph, October 5, 2016.
8 “Radicalisation and Violent Extremism – Focus on Women: How Women Become Radicalised, and How to Empower Them to Prevent Radicalisation,” 
Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality, Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Directorate General for Internal 
Policies, European Parliament, 2017, p. 28.
9 “As Caliphate Crumbles, ISIS ‘Turns to Female Suicide Bombers’,” The Arab Weekly, December 4, 2016.
10 Moha Ennaji, “Recruitment of Foreign Male and Female Fighters to Jihad: Morocco’s Multifaceted Counter-terror Strategy,” International Review of 
Sociology (Vol. 26, Issue 3, 2016), p. 551.
11 “Moroccan Police Busts Terrorist Cell Recruiting Women to IS,” www.maroc.ma, December 16, 2014; Interview with Jamal; Comment made by 
Mohammed Benaissa, President, North Observatory of Human Rights, at the workshop “Promotion of Think Tank Work on Violent Extremism in Morocco as 
well as Morocco’s Regional Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa and the MENA Region,” organized by DGAP-RSSI, Rabat, March 14-16, 2019.
12 Bahija Jamal, “Moroccan Counter-terrorism Policy: Case of Moroccan Female Migrants to ISIS,” International Journal of Criminology, 2018, pp. 3-4; 
Imrane Binoual, “’What Is happening in Syria Is Not Jihad’,” The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, January 24, 2015.
A clear picture of the motivations linked to push 
factors for female Moroccan migrants has yet to 
emerge. The only report that helps to shed some 
light on these factors is a 2014 report published by 
the Tetouan-based North Observatory for Human 
Rights. Its findings are based on surveys of a sample 
of thirty jihadists, of whom two were women, from 
areas in Northern Morocco from which many j i-
hadist migrants to Syria and Iraq hailed. Although the 
report does not attempt to carry out a gender-con-
scious analysis, it does suggest that some push fac-
tors are common to both men and women in these 
areas. Almost three-quarters of those surveyed came 
from disadvantaged social classes, often hailing from 
shantytowns of Fnideq, Martil, and Tetouan. Those 
surveyed stated that they were not socially inte-
grated into society, and tended to be economically 
marginalized, often working in the informal sector. 
They neither belonged to political parties nor associ-
ations, although some did partake in the February 20 
Movement.12 This indicates that socio-economic and 
political marginalization were major push factors, at 
least for females in these areas.
Gender-specific pull factors that have drawn females 
towards IS are easier to discern. Many women have 
been susceptible to recruitment because of the way 
that IS propaganda has exploited the value that many 
Moroccan women ascribe to traditional female gen-
der roles, and combined this with a sense of empow-
erment that traveling to the Caliphate seemed 
to offer. The importance attached to the role of 
Moroccan women were 
among the five largest 
 cohorts of women to travel 
to Syria and Iraq
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women in the Caliphate has also tapped into a desire 
for recognition and to be part of a divine project. 
Women are, for example, told that they will have the 
same status as male fighters in paradise.13 In many 
instances, females followed husbands, fathers, and 
brothers. Patriarchal norms within Moroccan society 
thus also had a role in drawing some women and girls 
towards IS territories in Syria and Iraq.14
While Moroccan women in IS territories in Syria and 
Iraq were often wives and mothers, some worked 
in media operations, as well as in the all-female 
Al-Khansaa Brigade, which was responsible for the 
enforcement of morals amongst females within 
 Syria.15 Several Moroccan women are also believed to 
have been in charge of female fighters in Syria.16
After the Caliphate
As the Caliphate began to fall in 2017, female immi-
grants began to try to flee, with some returning to 
their home countries and others becoming detained 
whilst trying. A good number of these women have 
been accompanied by children.17 Some 52 Moroc-
can women have returned to Morocco.18 A number 
are also known to be waiting in detention centers in 
Syria, Iraq, and Turkey in the hope of coming home. 
Morocco is obliged to accept them back, as long as 
their nationality can be proved.19
While those Moroccan women who have been 
engaged in terrorist-related offenses will face pros-
ecution on their return, the vast majority would not 
13 Interview with Jamal.
14 Benaissa (see footnote 11).
15 “ISIS Brides Returning Home and Raising Next Generation of Jihadist Martyrs,” National Post, November 27, 2017.
16 Interview with Jamal.
17 “ISIS Brides Returning Home.”
18 Interview with Jamal.
19 Souad Mekhennet and Joby Warrick, “The Jihadist Plan to Use Women to Launch the Next Incarnation of ISIS,” The Washington Post, November 26, 
2017.
20 “ISIS Brides Returning Home.”
21 Cook and Vale, “From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’,” p. 54.
have been involved in fighting and will therefore go 
free. Although many within the latter group pose lit-
tle threat to society or the state, this will not hold for 
all. While some would certainly have been coerced 
by their husbands to travel to Iraq and Syria, oth-
ers would have freely chosen to do so. Indeed, one 
Moroccan female returnee interviewed in the media 
admitted that it was her idea to travel to Syria and 
that it was she who persuaded her husband to join 
IS.20 Therefore, when assessing the risk that female 
returnees pose, the level of intent will be important.
Evaluating the extent to which female returnees are 
indoctrinated will present another challenge. While a 
wife or mother may not have been heavily indoctri-
nated, someone involved in developing propaganda 
or enforcing moral codes would have been. It can-
not, therefore, be assumed that all female returnees 
will be happy to resume their previous lives. Some 
may wish to carry forward the cause, either by rais-
ing their children according to IS precepts and keep-
ing alive the memory of the Caliphate or by actively 
engaging in recruitment or terrorist acts.
The lack of de-radicalization programs for highly-in-
doctrinated female returnees makes it more likely 
that they will get involved in terrorist-related activ-
ities on their return. The changing roles of women 
within IS increases the risk of this. Although IS did 
not initially allow women to take on operational and 
combat roles, when the Caliphate came under pres-
sure in 2017, some are reported to have carried out 
suicide attacks in defense of IS territories. IS propa-
ganda has also recently announced that it is the duty 
of women to wage jihad against its “enemies.”21
This shift in the official IS position on female roles in 
the group is accompanied by an increasing amount 
of all-female, family cells including women, and lone 
women perpetrating attacks globally. A precedent 
already exists in Morocco. In 2016, Moroccan security 
forces discovered a ten-member, all-female IS cell in 
Rabat, whose members were suspected of planning 
suicide bombings in multiple locations to coincide 
At least in some cases, 
 recruitment cells have been 
transnational
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with parliamentary elections held that year.22 Four of 
its members had married IS fighters based in Syria 
and Iraq over the internet.23
Even female returnees who are not heavily indoc-
trinated will need psychological support, at the very 
least. Many have been through traumatic experi-
ences. Living healthy lives and feeling part of soci-
ety could prove extremely challenging. Moreover, if 
the conditions that pushed some women to become 
marginalized in society in the first place still exist 
when they return to Morocco, their vulnerability to 
recruiters will persist.
Since the 2003 Casablanca bombings, which targeted 
tourist and Jewish cultural sites and left 45 people 
dead, Morocco has done a great deal to put in place 
a comprehensive approach to preventing violent 
extremism (PVE). To some extent, gender-specific 
drivers of radicalization have been taken into consid-
eration. As part of the reform of the religious sphere, 
a program has been established to train approxi-
mately fifty female religious councilors (murshidat) a 
year with the aim of spreading a tolerant and moder-
ate understanding of Islam. Although their counsel-
ing largely takes place in mosques, they also go out 
into the community to provide spiritual guidance. 
Much still remains to be done to address socio-eco-
nomic and political factors that contribute to the 
radicalization of women and girls, however.
Recommendations
 - Establish a national PVE research network, with 
transnational links
More needs to be done to develop gender-conscious 
research and analysis that examines push and pull 
factors specific to women and girls in Morocco. The 
development of a national PVE research network 
should be encouraged by Moroccan authorities. The 
latter could facilitate the creation of such a network 
by providing a platform for academics and policy 
analysts from think tanks to connect with each other 
and share their research findings, as well as finan-
cial support research and meetings. Given the trans-
national nature of jihadi networks and recruitment, 
links between Moroccan PVE researchers and those 
within other North African and European countries 
should also be fostered.
22 Lydia O’Neal, “Women in ISIS: Morocco Islamic State Attack Avoided After Terror Cell Arrested For Alleged Planned Suicide Bombing,” ibtimes.com, 
October 4, 2016.
23 Cook and Vale, “From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’,” p. 55.
24 Assia Bensalah Alaoui, “Morocco’s Security Strategy: Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism,” European Review (Vol. 16, 2017), p. 109.
 - Develop a more complete range of PVE measures 
aimed at women and girls
The findings of empirically based, gender-conscious 
studies should be used to inform a wider array of 
policy interventions. So far, counter-radicalization 
measures in Morocco have tended to place a great 
deal of emphasis on reform of the religious sphere. 
However, the drivers of radicalization, including that 
of females, also include issues such as socio-eco-
nomic and political marginalization. A broader set of 
evidence-based policies targeted at women, particu-
larly young women, is required.
 - Extend bridges to at-risk females in marginalized 
communities
Effective bridges to those at risk in marginalized 
communities also need to be built. The inclusion of 
Murshidat (female religious leaders) in the religious 
sphere is a step in the right direction. They provide a 
means of reaching out to women and girls who may 
be vulnerable to radicalization. However, those who 
are most at risk may not be receptive to counter-nar-
ratives sanctioned by official religious institutions. 
One way to address this is to boost the credibility of 
Murshidat by allowing them the freedom to encour-
age critical thinking. In addition, other actors who 
have credibility within communities where there are 
known to be large numbers of at-risk females should 
also be identified, and their potential role in prevent-
ing violent extremism explored.
 - Create online counter-narratives aimed specifically 
at females
Online counter-narratives informed by an under-
standing of female-specific drivers will also be crit-
ical. Information and research on female radicaliza-
tion in Morocco suggest that women and girls are 
particularly at risk from online recruitment. The 
Mohammedian League of Islamic scholars (Arrabita 
al-Mohammadia) has recently developed initiatives 
to counter online jihadi propaganda aimed especially 
at youth.24 A website dedicated to female-specific 
counter-narratives would be a welcome addition.
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 - Explore the merit of de-radicalization and re-inte-
gration programs for female returnees
De-radicalization programs and re-integration pro-
grams for female returnees should be looked into. 
Such programs for men already exist within the 
prison system in Morocco.25 However, most female IS 
migrants will not be convicted on their return. This 
means that de-radicalization and re-integration pro-
grams for female returnees living in the community 
are likely to be more appropriate. Examining “exit” 
programs in other countries could be a good place 
to start. The Netherlands, for example, has consider-
able experience in running exit programs, as well as 
community-based counter-radicalization programs 
for females, and could provide useful insights.26 Psy-
chological support for female returnees who show 
very low levels of indoctrination should also be made 
available.
Dr. Lisa Watanabe is Head of the Swiss and 
Euro-Atlantic Security Team at the Center for 
Security Studies (CSS), Swiss Federal Technical 
Institute (ETH) in Zurich, Switzerland.
25 Mohammed Masbah, “The Limits of Morocco’s Attempt to Comprehensively Counter Violent Extremism,” Middle East Brief, Crown Center for Middle East 
Studies, Brandeis University, No. 118, May 2018, p. 5.
26 Lorenzo Vidino, “A Preliminary Assessment of Counter-Radicalisation in The Netherlands,” CTC Sentinel (Vol. 1, Issue 9, 2008); Amy-Jane Gielen, “Exit 
programs for Female Jihadists: A Proposal for Conducting Realistic Evaluation of the Dutch Approach, International Sociology (Vol. 33, No. 4, 2018).
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PROMOTING THE AGENCY OF 
WOMEN IN PREVENTING AND 
COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
IN MOROCCO
Clarisse Anceau
Policy- and decision-makers striving to prevent and 
counter violent extremism (P/CVE) in Morocco have 
recently started to engage women in their programs. 
Considering women as a means to enter the private 
sphere, policymakers have often reduced women’s role 
to their influence within the family. However, women 
have also played crucial roles beyond the scope of the 
household, taking the fight against violent extremism 
as an opportunity to transform gender norms and 
access the political sphere. In their efforts to include 
women in P/CVE programs, policymakers should give 
women a leading role in order to increase the efficiency 
of their actions as well as to promote women’s agency.
In recent years, the special potential of women in 
preventing and countering violent extremism (P/
CVE) has started to be recognized. In Morocco, var-
ious initiatives funded and designed by international 
organizations, governmental, and non-governmental 
organizations aim to support women’s roles in P/
CVE. These efforts have been based on different dis-
courses and developed through various approaches.
In widespread security discourse, women are of 
interest to policy-makers as potential de-radicaliz-
ers and early warning systems. They are perceived 
to embody the role of inside mediators in families 
and communities, representing an entry point to the 
private sphere and, as such, enabling outside parties 
to reach individuals who are difficult to access and 
influence. This discourse relies on gender stereo-
types such as women’s emotional influence over chil-
dren, relational capacities, and inherent peacefulness. 
As such, they are based on questionable assumptions 
that overlook the active role that women have taken 
in political violence and violent extremism as recruit-
ers, propagators, or suicide bombers. As expressed in 
the OSCE’s 2012 final report on “Women and Terror-
ist Radicalization”: “a woman should not be assumed 
to be more or less dangerous [than men], nor more 
27 “Women and Terrorist Radicalization: Final Report,” Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, February 2013, p. 3. <http://www.osce.org/
secretariat/99919?download=true> (accessed May 9, 2019).
28 F. Ní Aoláin, “Jihad, counter-terrorism and mother,” Just Security, March 4, 2015, <https://www.justsecurity.org/20407/jihad-counter-terrorism-
mothers/> (accessed May 9, 2019).
29 M. Satterthwaite and J. Huckerby, Gender, National Security and Counter-Terrorism: Human Rights Perspectives (Abingdon, 2013), p. 50.
30 Ibid.
31 S. Dharmapuri, “UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and Countering Violent Extremism: Using a Gender Perspective to Enhance Operational 
Effectiveness,” in Naureen Chowdhury Fink et. al. (eds), A Man’s World: Exploring the Role of Women in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism, The 
Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016, p. 41.
prone to peace, dialogue, non-violence and co-oper-
ation than a man. […] The very image of the peaceful 
woman has been used by terrorist groups to recruit 
women and to claim an innocent and non-violent 
character by highlighting the involvement of women 
in their organizations.”27
This leads to a second problem: women’s presumed 
relational capacities have also been used by violent 
extremist groups by working with them as recruit-
ment tools. Using the same rhetoric as the groups 
against whom one acts seems to be inconsistent and 
counter-productive. In such discourse, the relevance 
of women in P/CVE only derives from their role in 
the family and their presumed qualities. Women are 
understood as mere subjects and the vehicles of pro-
grams, not as rights-holders and activists with com-
plex identities operating in both public and private 
spheres.28 They are engaged as a means of justifying 
security policies rather than as part of an endeavor 
that acknowledges their political agency.29
The multiple roles that women can play in P/CVE as 
policy shapers, educators, community members, and 
activists have already been highlighted by the OSCE 
report.30 Two types of approach to further women’s 
agency in P/CVE programs can be distinguished: 
accommodating approaches and transformative 
approaches. Agency means the capacity to act inde-
pendently according to one’s own will and goals, and 
the ability to have control over one’s behavior and 
choices.
Assessing Accommodating Approaches in P/CVE
Accommodating approaches tend to increase 
 women’s presence and voice in community matters 
without requiring the transformation of social and 
cultural norms between men and women. Through 
these approaches, women are presented with the 
opportunity to be visible and heard in public within 
the constraints of their culturally and socially spe-
cific gendered identities.31 In terms of P/CVE, this 
translates mostly into a type of approach that allows 
spaces for women to share and exchange knowl-
edge acquired through their experiences of violent 
extremism, as well as receiving training in order to 
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deter young people, especially their children, from 
joining extremist groups.
In Morocco, the Rabita Mohammadia des Oulémas 
is a public interest foundation promoting a moder-
ate and tolerant Islam through scientific research 
and public education. Its P/CVE efforts specifically 
involving women include capacity building for young 
women for awareness-raising on at-risk behaviors, as 
well as training mothers to detect signs of radical-
ization, to seek information, obtain alternative mes-
sages, and report behavior to authorities.32 Trained 
women will then become educators for their peers. 
Creative Associates leads a US Department of State 
P/CVE project integrating women, although gender 
was not an initial focus. In Salé, the team works with 
mothers in marginalized neighborhoods and teaches 
them how to detect radicalization among youth, 
including girls recruited through promises of mar-
riage. Sixty mothers and unemployed young women 
have been trained to detect hate speech and signs of 
extremism and other signs of radicalization, and to 
provide psychological support to relatives at risk of 
radicalization.33
These approaches are laudable as they provide 
women with psychological support, tools, and a net-
work to face difficult situations with radicalized chil-
dren. They are not purely exploitative as they try to 
integrate women into a network and offer them sup-
port. However, involving women in P/CVE through 
their mother status and maternal role presents some 
risks for these women as well as barriers to effective 
programs.
32 “USAID/Morocco Gender Analysis (Final),” United States Agency for International Development, March 2018, p. 68 <https://banyanglobal.com/
wp-content/uploads/2018/03/USAID-Morocoo-Gender-Analysis-2018.pdf> (accessed May 9, 2019).
33 Ibid.
34 C. De Jonge Oudraat, “Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism: The Role of Women and Women’s Organizations,” in Chowdhury Fink, A Man’s 
World, p. 29.
35 More precisely, participants in the Women Without Borders/Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE) 2010 workshop in Yemen.
36 K. Brown, “Gender and Counter-Radicalization, Women and emerging Counter-Terrorism measures” in Satterthwaite and Huckerby, Gender, National 
Security and Counter-Terrorism, p.36-59.
Firstly, gender inequality, including women’s financial 
dependencies, means that women might not be will-
ing or able to speak up when members of their family 
are radicalized. Mothers in particular may be tempted 
by their children’s pledges to improve conditions 
for the family, resulting in the mothers “protecting” 
their children from community and law enforcement 
interventions. In such cases, women easily become 
passive, if not active, enablers of violent extremist 
ideologies.34 Secondly, participants in a similar pro-
gram have pointed out that women with less formal 
education struggle to recognize the warning signs, as 
they may perceive their children as merely becoming 
more religious and consider the change to be posi-
tive.35 Besides, mothers are sometimes expected to 
report information to local authorities. This spying 
component is particularly dangerous for women as 
they could be viewed with suspicion or even rejected 
by their own community. It also creates a sense of 
women being “used” and “exploited” rather than 
being empowered to participate fully in society. Last 
but not least, underpinning the focus on mothers is 
the notion that perceived poor parenting, including 
the failure to provide a good religious education, cor-
relates to radicalization of children.36 As a result, it 
shifts the responsibility from the state to civil society, 
and in particular to mothers who are assigned blame 
for the potential radicalization of their children.
However, when affected women themselves initiate 
P/CVE efforts, the potential feeling of being “used” 
fades away, leaving space for agency. One example of 
an innovative and positive venture is the Moroccan 
Association of Victims of Terrorism (AMVT), created 
by Soad Begdouri Elkammal after losing her husband 
and son in the suicide attacks in Casablanca on May 
16, 2003. Even when acting as a mother and wife, 
she has gone beyond this role by launching a P/CVE 
campaign in schools and using her skills as a teacher 
to reach poor young people and raise civil soci-
ety awareness of violent extremism through public 
events. As such, her activism stems from her experi-
ence as a mother but extends beyond the household 
and maternal role itself.
Murshidat have become 
religious authorities and 
community leaders
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Assessing Transformative Approaches in P/CVE: 
The Case of the Murshidat
Transformative P/CVE efforts actively strive to ques-
tion and change rigid gender norms and inequali-
ties between men and women. For instance, such 
approaches can increase men’s and women’s critical 
awareness of gender roles and power relationships in 
the community, promote new positions for women in 
the society, and enable access to the same resources 
for men and women.37 The training of women reli-
gious guides (murshidat) in Morocco is a good 
example of a state-sponsored program endorsing 
a transformative approach and promoting women’s 
participation in the sociopolitical domain.
After the 2003 terrorist attacks in Casablanca that 
killed over 40 people and injured around 100, King 
Mohammed VI decided to restructure the reli-
gious sector and promote a moderate message of 
Islam in order to limit the spread of jihad ideology 
and contain extremist groups. Both feminist and I s-
lamist women attempted to position themselves as 
appropriate agents in this crisis, activating a feminist 
agenda addressed to the state. While feminist groups 
who appropriated the discourses of modernity and 
democracy pushed for a reform of family law, Islamist 
women directed their efforts at articulating a radical 
demand: they wanted to be admitted to positions of 
religious leadership and to be recognized for their 
ability to lecture in state-controlled mosques.38
More specifically, women activists of Islamist politi-
cal movements39 redefined motherhood according to 
the Koranic concept of wassat, which characterizes 
Muslims as the people of the middle way, meaning 
that they occupy both a median location and a mod-
erate position. This term enabled Islamist women to 
articulate new identities around an imagined moth-
erhood, linked to women’s role as mediators. As the 
term “moderation” was used by the Moroccan gov-
ernment to justify reforming the religious field and 
controlling the discourse of the mosque, Islamist 
women’s appropriation of this term provided them 
with negotiating power in dealing with the Moroc-
37 Dharmapuri, “UN Security Council Resolution 1325,” p. 43.
38 Z. Salime, “The War on Terrorism: Appropriation and Subversion by Moroccan Women,” in K. Alexander and M. Hawkesworth (eds), War & Terror. Feminist 
Perspectives (Chicago, 2008), p. 431.
39 I refer here to interviews conducted by Zakia Salime with women activists of two Islamist political movements “al-Adl w-al-Ihsane” and “a-Adala w-al-
Tanmia.” Ibid., p. 431.
40 Ibid.
41 “A Gendered Approach to Countering Violent Extremism. Lessons Learned from Women in Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention Applied Successfully 
in Bangladesh and Morocco,” Foreign Policy at Brookings, July 2014, p. 43 <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Women-CVE-
Formatted-72914-Couture-FINAL2.pdf> (accessed May 9, 2019).
42 M. El Haitami, “Restructuring Female Religious Authority: State-Sponsored Women Religious Guide (Murshidat) and Scholars (‘Alimat) in Contemporary 
Morocco,” Mediterranean Studies (No. 2, 2012), p. 228.
43 Ibid., p. 230.
can state in order to obtain official recognition as full 
players on the religious and political scene.40
By receiving a solid education in religious and social 
disciplines, the murshidat of this program have been 
able to become religious authorities and commu-
nity leaders, working at prisons, hospitals, orphan-
ages, schools, and nursing homes. This program has 
placed women in leadership positions and increased 
the number of female imams from 50 to 500 between 
2005 and 2014.41 According to Meriem El Haitami, 
“the deployment of women into the religious field 
implies a redefinition of religious spaces, such as 
mosques and religious councils, which have long 
been male-dominated centers of Islamic authority.”42 
This shift from predominantly private forms of reli-
giosity to a legitimated public expression challenges 
the commonly held assumption that male official reli-
gious authority is more legitimate.43
The murshidat program has been viewed not only 
as a success in the fight against terrorism, but also 
as a way to transform the status of women by giving 
them non-traditional roles. Women themselves were 
able to use gender stereotypes in order to access 
spaces they could not access beforehand and rede-
fine gender norms. Although this program is initiated 
and supported by the state, women are not passive 
beneficiaries. It is rather their activism in revising the 
Islamic sharia and reforming the Islamist movements 
that allowed them to obtain a leading role in P/CVE.
When affected  women 
launch P/CVE efforts, the 
feeling of being “used” 
fades away
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Despite these perceived successes, the program 
is not premised on strict equality between sexes. 
Murshidat do not receive as rigorous a training in 
the Koran as men, and are prohibited from leading 
prayers and giving sermons. Nor do they receive 
exactly the same teaching content as men, and are 
excluded from courses on leadership, for instance. 
Rather, the program seems premised on the essen-
tialist assumption that women will offer something 
different from what men offer to Islam. It is widely 
understood that the increased emphasis on feminin-
ity, specifically on women as emotional, sentimental, 
and motherly, will cultivate positive images of the 
Islamic faith and in return decrease invalid beliefs 
affiliated with radical and extremist tendencies. The 
risk is then to leave gender dualisms – that is, the 
fixed categorization of what constitutes a “man” and 
what constitutes a “woman” – intact inside the pub-
lic sphere where men have intellectual rigor, while 
women are sentimental.
The ability of the murshidat to freely use the space 
they have acquired and to share their own interpre-
tation of the Koran is limited in practice. Depend-
ing on the audience they are addressing, they more 
or less have freedom to spread their own thoughts 
and thus have a personal influence. Moreover, when 
speaking in mosques, the murshidat are limited to 
voicing the state’s religious discourse, especially 
with regard to the identity of women. This creates a 
risk that the gendered pattern will be strengthened 
within an institutionalized framework through the 
voices of women having a non-transformative dis-
course on gender roles.
Combining Both Approaches
These two types of approach suit women of vary-
ing socio-economic backgrounds. One should not 
be weighed against another but used in parallel, 
depending on the target groups. Because transfor-
mative approaches might require participants to be 
personally strongly invested in the project, it can be 
difficult for many women to implement it. That is why 
accommodating approaches are also to be encour-
aged when designed in a way that take  women’s 
needs and concerns into account.
For both approaches, the critical point is to include 
women as agents, not subjects. The more they are 
involved at every step of the strategies against violent 
extremism, the higher the degree of their inclusion. 
High inclusion of women is crucial for the success of 
the program, as it would avoid the aforementioned 
risks for women and increase the success of P/CVE 
programs.
Recommendations
 - Private foundations and other international 
donors willing to provide funds for P/CVE efforts 
in Morocco should support women’s own initiatives
Women and women’s organizations should be 
encouraged and supported with funding when 
they themselves initiate efforts in P/CVE. Even if 
the approach developed is an accommodating one, 
supporting those women can have a transformative 
effect as they will become role models to their com-
munities.
 - Project designers and managers in international 
and Moroccan organizations or NGOs should 
involve affected women in the design and imple-
mentation of their P/CVE programs
In order to ensure that programs do no harm, women 
living in areas specifically affected by radicalization 
should be engaged in all decision-making processes 
to design and implement P/CVE programs. Perform-
ing such a contextual analysis of gender dynamics on 
the ground prior to designing programs or writing 
policy would enable a better understanding of the 
environment in which they operate. Women targeted 
by the program would thus be able to assess the risks 
such programs can represent for themselves. They 
should be involved not only through consultation but 
also in hiring women to draft and drive the projects. 
It would further encourage women’s agency, as they 
will not be the subjects of state and organizational 
programs but the actors of such programs. In a proj-
ect proposal, their activism and capacity to shape 
policy should be highlighted instead of describing 
them in need of action.
 - International and Moroccan organizations dealing 
with P/CVE should coordinate their actions and 
cooperate with national and local women’s orga-
nizations, such as l’Union Nationale des Femmes 
du Maroc (UNFM) and l’Union de l’Action Féminine 
(UAF)
When organizations negotiate the design and 
implementation of P/CVE programs with the state, 
 women’s organizations should be integrated into 
negotiations. Cooperation with women’s organiza-
tions would enable women’s concerns and claims 
to be voiced, and programs to be better tailored in 
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order to address these concerns. This would also 
improve coordination with efforts that have already 
been deployed to change gender norms.
Clarisse Anceau is a PhD candidate and lecturer 
at Sciences Po Paris.
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MOROCCO’S MURSHIDAT 
AS ACTORS IN COUNTER-
RADICALIZATION POLICIES
Meriem El Haitami
Morocco’s innovative counter-radicalization policies 
in the aftermath of the 2003 Casablanca terrorist 
attacks were particularly marked by the training of 
female religious leaders (murshidat) to promote mod-
erate values based on the practice of Maliki-Sufi Islam. 
Morocco’s deployment of women as active players in 
preserving the country’s “spiritual security” highlights 
the role of organized women’s agency in addressing 
the socio-economic needs of at-risk members of soci-
ety. That said, women are still relegated to caregiving 
roles as mothers, sisters, and wives who are well posi-
tioned to identify early signs of radicalization, which 
produces a gendered approach to Prevention and 
Countering of Violent Extremism (P/CVE) programs. 
Effective counter-radicalization efforts should include 
women in processes of reconstruction and peacebuild-
ing and not limit their roles to preventing radicaliza-
tion. Privileging the practice of independent reasoning 
(ijtihad) to counterbalance monolithic or extrem-
ist interpretations of religious texts is also critically 
important.
Morocco’s major challenge over the past decade has 
been to conceptualize ways to counter the rise of 
religious extremism by launching religious reforms 
and promoting moderate mainstream Islam to main-
tain political and social cohesion and strengthen the 
country’s “spiritual security.” The concept of “spiri-
tual security” emerged in the context of the 2003 
terrorist attacks which took place in Casablanca. The 
tragic magnitude of the event prompted Moroccan 
authorities to reconsider the state’s religious policy 
and promote moderate values based on the practice 
of the legal Maliki school of thought and Sufi-in-
spired values to establish religious homogeneity and 
thus maintain a “kind of ‘Moroccan moral order’.”44 
As a result, Morocco has placed countering violent 
extremism (CVE) at the top of its policy priorities 
both domestically and transnationally, and its efforts 
have gone widely acknowledged. 
Morocco’s commitment to counter-radicalization 
efforts was marked by a range of initiatives that 
include the training of male imams and female mur-
shidat (female religious leaders); reforming religious 
structures and monitoring places of worship; estab-
44 Driss Maghraoui, “The Strengths and Limits of Religious Reforms in Morocco,” Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 14, No. 2, July 2009, pp. 195–211 (p. 197).
45 “Morocco Women Preachers Appointed,” BBC World News, May 4, 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4971792.stm> (accessed May 15, 2019).
lishing a religious council in Europe for Moroccans 
residing abroad; and launching radio and television 
channels to promote moderate teachings. According 
to the Minister of Islamic Affairs, Ahmed Taoufiq, the 
main purpose of the imam and murshidat training 
program is to spread a tolerant and moderate mes-
sage of Islam in order to curb all emerging forms of 
extremism. Taoufiq further highlights that the rele-
vance of the work of the imams and murshidat lies 
in preventing the intrusion of foreign agents who try 
to violate Morocco’s tolerant values and traditions.45
Further, the country continues to make headways 
in its strategy to promote religious tolerance. The 
re-evaluation of religious education curricula and 
textbooks to introduce values consistent with the 
state’s vision of tolerant Islam is a major component 
of Morocco’s strategy to counter religious extrem-
ism. The conference on the rights of minorities in 
the Islamic world held in Marrakesh in January 2016 
reiterated the state’s message of religious tolerance 
and represented a particularly significant milestone 
in the conversation on minority rights in Muslim-ma-
jority countries, highlighting the country’s promis-
ing movement toward promoting a more inclusive 
national identity.
The Murshidat as Providers of Spiritual Security
The mainstreaming of a gendered approach to 
Morocco’s counter-radicalization strategy is par-
ticularly compelling. State-sponsored women’s reli-
gious activism emerged as a byproduct of the state’s 
endeavor to control and monitor the religious field 
and was marked by the deployment of murshidat, 
who offer religious teachings and counseling in 
mosques and other institutions including schools, 
hospitals, and prisons. 
One hundred murshidat graduate every year after 
completing a 12-month training program during 
which they take a variety of courses, with the main 
focus on religious training. The murshidat are 
appointed in different mosques across the country in 
both urban and rural settings. Their mosque-based 
activities include structured classes addressing spe-
cific religious disciplines based on the Maliki-Sufi 
interpretation and attracting regular attendees. 
Religious instruction is oftentimes complemented 
by literacy classes. Another element of the murshi-
dats’ work incorporates the education of women 
and youth in a range of social venues. According to a 
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number of religious functionaries, the program was 
groundbreaking for its modernization of the religious 
sphere in Morocco and its impact on society at large. 
The relevance of the murshidat’s work lies in their 
proximity to women and youth’s concerns through 
a number of activities, such as mobilizing members 
of the community to arrange visits to places such as 
schools, hospitals, and youth centers with the pur-
pose of constructive exchange. According to the 
Ministry of Islamic Affairs, “more than 500 murshidat 
have graduated since 2006, which means a squad of 
educated women who invest great effort in coun-
tering extremism.”46 The murshidat’s “official” role 
impacts their ability to contribute to de-radicaliza-
tion, by educating women and providing a safe and 
productive avenue for women and youths and there-
fore deter potential catalysts towards radicalization. 
Their newfound role in the fight against extremism 
enables them to have a significant impact and alters 
structures of religious authority. They are increas-
ingly appropriating such religious spaces as mosques 
and religious councils, and attracting a broad female 
following.
In addition to their work with women and youths in 
mosques and social venues, the murshidats also work 
in the prison system with female inmates. Their work 
includes offering religious and literacy classes, offer-
ing awareness of social, religious, cultural, and health 
issues, as well as providing emotional and social 
support to prison inmates and monitoring them to 
encourage their re-inclusion in society. According 
to Hanane Dahi, a murshida who works with prison 
inmates, the focus should be on “integrating these 
women into society and give them jobs and an edu-
cation (…) they do not have a source of income and 
their communities and families do not necessarily 
welcome them back.”47 Another murshida, Khadija 
Aktami, believes that the murshidat’s major chal-
lenge is to change the way society perceives prison 
inmates: “one main challenge is to make the situa-
tion of women in prison a social concern and create 
structures that support these women until they’re 
able to be financially independent”.48
46 “Murshidat Diniyyat Yuharibna Tatarruf,” Alaraby, May 26, 2016<https://www.alaraby.co.uk/society/2016/5/23/-يحاربن-دينيات-مرشدات1-لمغرب-فيا-
لتطرف>ا (accessed May 15, 2019).
47 Author interview with Dahi Hanane, March 2012.
48 Author interview with Aktami Khadija, March 2012.
49 Krista London-Couture, “A Gendered Approach to Countering Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned from Women in Peacebuilding and Conflict 
Prevention Applied Successfully in Bangladesh and Morocco,” Foreign Policy at Brookings, July 2014, p. 11.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
The murshidat’s work therefore suggests significant 
shifts in the social order. Through their ability to 
offer social services and reach out to communities at 
risk, they define a new model of activism, which has 
become a key component of Morocco’s CVE program.
The Murshidat as CVE Actors: Promises and Lim-
itations
Since their recruitment, the murshidat have signifi-
cantly contributed to disseminating the state’s vision 
of moderate mainstream Islam as a counterweight to 
extremist ideology. The state vision of Islam acknowl-
edges the importance of mainstreaming women 
in CVE programs. That said, the murshidats’ work 
remains confined to traditional roles as “caregivers”49 
who are “well-positioned” to identify and prevent 
possible catalysts, and target women as agents of 
peace and contributors to deradicalization among 
their immediate communities: “women in the role 
of ‘mothers’ can act as ambassadors of constructive 
change with their children by teaching (and model-
ing) moderation, tolerance, and acceptance.”50 The 
latter assumes that women are inherent allies to CVE, 
due to their conventional ties as wives or mothers to 
radicalized men: “when women are considered to be 
potential violent extremists themselves, the rhetoric 
often emphasizes the grooming and emotional insta-
bility that leads to such radicalization.”51
However, the assumption that women are peaceful 
allies neglects the narratives of radicalized women 
as active actors and perpetrators within radicalized 
circles, as well as the diversity of their motivation, 
State-sponsored  women’s 
religious activism was 
marked by the deployment 
of murshidat
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which “ranges from a quest for belonging, the aspira-
tion to help build a utopian Islamic state, to belong to 
something bigger and divine and a (perceived) moral 
duty to support their Muslim brothers and sisters, to 
a sense of adventure, the prospect of marriage, or a 
combination thereof.”52
In 2017, Morocco initiated a pilot program called 
“Musalaha,” geared towards Jihadi-Salafi prisoners. 
The program aims at promoting dialogue and recon-
ciliation based on three components: psychological 
rehabilitation, reintegration in society, and recon-
ciliation with moderate interpretations of religious 
texts.53 That said, the Musalaha program lacks a 
gender-sensitive approach. Women represent five 
percent of prisoners convicted of terror charges,54 
however, they are not included in reconciliation ini-
tiatives. Further, the murshidat are not included in 
mentoring and vocational training processes, which 
points to how terrorism and counter-terrorism 
remain a male domain. According to the US State 
Department, “historically, girls and women have not 
been viewed as a terrorist problem or solution, so 
are not looked at through a counterterrorism lens 
(...) women represent an enormously under-utilized 
resource in the struggle against violent extremism.”55 
The underrepresentation of the murshidat in pro-
cesses of counter-radicalization and de-radicaliza-
tion represents a major limitation to contributing to 
sustainable deradicalization and rehabilitation pro-
cesses.
Other factors that limit the murshidat’s impact on 
the larger community include increasing youth dis-
52 Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality, “Radicalization and Violent Extremism-Focus on Women: How women become radicalized, and 
how to empower them to prevent radicalization,” Policy Department for Citizen’s Rights and Constitutional Affairs, December 2017, p. 9.
53 CSIS Headquarters, “Security in the Maghreb: Identifying Threats, Assessing Strategies, and Defining Success,” December 4, 2017 <https://www.csis.
org/events/security-maghreb-identifying-threats-assessing-strategies-and-defining-success> (accessed May 15, 2019).
54 “almaghreb : al-Irhab Taraja’ wa Nisa’ La’ibna Dawran Kabiran Fi Tajnid Chabab,” Al ‘Alam Al ‘Arabi, July 1, 2018 <https://arabic.sputniknews.com/arab_
world/201807011033459433-لشباب-اد تجني-نلساء-هابا إلر-لمغرب/ا > (accessed May 15, 2019). 
55 London-Couture, “A Gendered Approach,” p. 10.
56 Dale Eickelman and Jon Anderson (eds), New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere (Indiana University Press, 2003), p. 33.
enchantment with monitored religious discourse and 
the dominant political ideologies; other platforms 
have emerged as alternative sources of knowledge 
and practice, creating multiple forms of religiosity. 
Morocco is witnessing mixtures of traditional prac-
tices and norms with novel religious interpretations 
and sets of values that result from dynamic cultural 
processes as well as hybridized local and global influ-
ences. Technology plays a particularly important 
role in constructing collective and individual iden-
tities. It provides easier access to religious schol-
arship beyond the authority of local preachers, and 
gives a voice to young Muslims who have become 
more engaged in criticizing the religious establish-
ment and creating their own interpretations. Dale 
 Eickelman notes that access to new technologies 
has multiplied the channels through which ideas and 
information can be circulated: “It has eroded the abil-
ity of authorities to censor and repress, to project an 
uncontested ‘central’ message defining political and 
religious issues for large numbers of people... Cen-
sors may still restrict what is said in the mainstream 
press and broadcast media, but these media have 
lost the exclusivity they once had. Mass education 
and the availability of alternative media have irrevo-
cably altered how ‘authoritative’ discourse is read and 
heard.”56
The murshidats’ work is instrumental in maintaining 
social and political order and addressing the needs 
of struggling youth. The latter however raises ques-
tions about the impact they can have in accounting 
for the increasingly diverse public space by stretch-
ing the limits of state-promoted or traditional inter-
pretations of Islam. The homogenization of religious 
expression through the construction of a “Moroc-
can Islam” limits the potential for a diverse public 
space and interpretive diversity, although the coun-
try claims to make headways in its strategy to pro-
mote religious tolerance. The promise of progressive 
ijtihad (the practice of independent reasoning) that 
underpins religious reform remains thus highly ques-
tionable, since the official religious establishment 
has full control over its process and execution. The 
discursive construction of Morocco’s religio-polit-
ical space therefore demonstrates how women are 
expected to promote propriety and systemic change 
Youth’s disenchantment 
with monitored discourses 
limits the murshidats’ 
impact
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as opposed to anti-systemic change. The latter gen-
der-specific challenges reveal a lack of a comprehen-
sive gender-sensitive strategy.
Recommendations
 - Prioritize progressive ijtihad
The murshidat, as well as other religious actors, can 
play an important role in advancing a more tolerant 
interpretation of Islam if more independent exercise 
of theological knowledge is encouraged, especially 
given that they have better access to different social 
categories and social institutions due to their official 
status.
 - Foster greater inclusion of women in counter-ter-
rorism and peacebuilding processes
The emergence and expansion of state-based female 
religious action is a product of the state’s hegemony 
over the public sphere, which reveals an intricate 
interplay between the politics of religion, gender, 
and the rhetoric of political liberalization in Morocco. 
Therefore, although women are afforded expanded 
space in structures of institutionalized Islam, they 
still negotiate their marginality in the masculinized 
“national security processes.” State-sponsored reli-
gious actors can serve as key partners and collabora-
tors, by engaging women and developing necessary 
training to ensure more effective partnerships and 
more inclusive security processes, as well as greater 
involvement in the different stages of CVE process, 
in which women are still significantly underrepre-
sented.
Meriem El Haitami is an assistant professor at the 
Université Internationale de Rabat, Morocco.
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OFFICIAL ISLAM’S INVOLVEMENT IN 
PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
– CRITICAL INSIGHTS FROM 
MOROCCO
Salim Hmimnat
The Moroccan experience presents a typical case of 
how religion is intensively incorporated into a multi-
pronged strategy to combat violent extremism. Moroc-
co’s religion-based Prevention of Violent Extremism 
(PVE) strategy lies in its reliance on a well-structured 
religious bureaucracy that functions in line with a 
politically-oriented, inclusive vision using persuasive, 
sophisticated tools, and which supposedly operates in 
tandem the other socio-economic and security aspects 
that comprise the total national PVE strategy. Never-
theless, this religion-based strategy suffers from sev-
eral challenges and deficiencies, including the ideolog-
ical vision framing it, its instrumentalization to serve 
certain political interests, and the uncertain efficacy 
and effectiveness of its modes of functioning, outreach, 
and scope of action. In order to improve coordination 
between the different institutions involved in Moroc-
co’s PVE strategy, an intergovernmental body should 
be created that can synergize their fragmented activi-
ties. In addition, state-run religious institutions should 
develop indicators to assess the impact of their activi-
ties. Finally, religious associations and scholars should 
be involved and provided with appropriate training to 
effectively contribute to Morocco’s PVE efforts.
Morocco presents a significant case study of how 
religion can be incorporated as a crucial component 
in a multidimensional strategy for preventing violent 
extremism (PVE). The significance of religion lies not 
only in sustaining the effectiveness of the country’s 
PVE strategy in the medium- and long-term, but also 
in transforming Morocco’s experience, accumulated 
over the preceding 15 years, into a marketing tool 
for promoting the Kingdom’s image as a key leader 
in regional counter-terrorism efforts. The increasing 
interest by African and European countries to engage 
extensively with Morocco in bilateral cooperation on 
57 For a detailed account of Moroccan African cooperation on religious matters, see S. Hmimnat, “‘Spiritual security’ as a (meta-)political strategy to 
compete over regional leadership: formation of Morocco’s transnational religious policy towards Africa,” The Journal of North African Studies November 21, 
2018, DOI: <10.1080/13629387.2018.1544073>.
58 According to the US State Department’s 2017 Country Reports on Terrorism (September 2018, p. 148), the number of returned Moroccan Jihadi fighters 
form “Jihad lands” is estimated at 1,660 <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/283100.pdf> (accessed May 15, 2019).
59 Ibid.
60 L’observateur, 11-17 January, 2019, p. 17.
61 “Morocco: suspects in tourists’ killing were ‘acting alone’,” Aljazeera, December 24, 2018 <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/morocco-
suspects-tourists-killing-acting-181224075720902.html> (accessed May 15, 2019).
religious matters57 is a perfect indicator of the grow-
ing visibility and significance of this experience.
Leaving aside this questionable “success story,” an 
examination of the Moroccan PVE experience in 
the light of factual and empirical evidence raises an 
interesting paradox: the Moroccan state tends to 
publicize its national PVE strategy as a “unique,” “pio-
neering” model in tackling the ideological sources of 
extremism. This official discourse offers as evidence 
the fact that the country witnesses the least number 
of terrorist attacks compared to its neighbors. How-
ever, it is surprising to observe, first, the growing 
proportion of Moroccan fighters reportedly involved 
in international terrorist groups operating in the 
Middle East58 and Europe. Second, the rise of recidi-
vism among former extremist detainees is estimated 
at 225 cases.59 Third is the growing number of terror-
ist cells dismantled by the Moroccan security author-
ities. According to the latest figures published by the 
Central Bureau of Judiciary Investigations (BCIJ),60 187 
terrorist cells planning terrorist actions in the King-
dom were dismantled in the period between 2002 
until January 2019, and more than 3,202 people were 
arrested.
The figures recorded above can be interpreted in 
two different ways. At first glance, they indicate the 
Moroccan security services’ high vigilance and pro-
fessional capacities in dealing proactively with ter-
rorist plots. The same figures, in contrast, can be 
seen problematic in the sense they cast doubt on the 
official narrative of Morocco’s “pioneering, unique 
model” in combating terrorism in the region. The 
recent terrorist murder of two Scandinavian tour-
ists in Morocco’s Atlas Mountains on December 12, 
2018, only exacerbated the very problem it purports 
to address: the Kingdom provides a fertile “ter-
ror hotbed” for homegrown violent extremism that 
threatens security and also supplies transnational 
terrorist groups with potential foreign fighters. The 
four Moroccan suspects involved in the double mur-
der were reportedly steeped in extremist ideology, 
“acting alone,” while having pledged allegiance to the 
Islamic State (IS).61 The BCIJ chief, Abdelhak Khiam, 
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has revealed that three of the 22 suspects brought 
before the judge overseeing terrorism cases were 
identified as already having “a court record linked to 
terrorist acts.”62 Abdessamad al-Jud, the emir of the 
terrorist “Imlil Cell,” was arrested in 2014 for trying 
to recruit Moroccan fighters for Syrian jihadi groups, 
then brought to justice and sentenced to three years 
in prison before being released in 2015.63
Contextualizing Moroccan Religion-Based PVE
The 2003 Casablanca terrorist attacks, known as the 
“Moroccan 9/11”, were a critical turning point in the 
history of contemporary Morocco. The attacks gen-
erated a feeling of uncertainty and anxiety about the 
existence of a home-grown form of religious extrem-
ism that threatens the country’s security and stabil-
ity. The attacks further undermined the official nar-
rative of “Moroccan exceptionalism,” which is used to 
represent the kingdom as an “oasis of stability” and a 
symbol of coexistence and tolerance, thus deeming 
the country immune to such religious fanaticism. In 
this uncertain context, religion has been shifted from 
a source of legitimization to an object of securitiza-
tion.64
Shocked by these terrorist attacks, Moroccan 
authorities primarily reacted through undertaking 
coercive measures including mass arrests of nearly 
2,000 suspected Salafi extremists and the endorse-
ment of anti-terror and anti–money-laundering leg-
islation. Other repressive measures were taken with 
a view to enhancing intelligence-gathering and inter-
nal security governance, which culminated in the 
creation of the Central Bureau of Judiciary Investiga-
tions in 2015, branded as the “Moroccan FBI.” Seem-
ingly aware of the limitations of relying excessively 
on a purely security-based strategy, a multi-pronged 
counterterrorism strategy has been developed since 
2004, intended to address the breeding grounds of 
growing radicalization, especially among the younger 
generation. In addition to the security component, 
this encompasses the initiation of social and human 
development programs (INDH) to tackle poverty and 
other socio-economic vulnerabilities and the pro-
motion of social inclusion of deprived people and 
groups. It also includes deep reforms in the religious 
field, with the goal of curbing the extremist doctrines 
62 “Moroccan Interior Minister: The killing of the tourists is not related to a large terrorist organization, but to individuals who are steeped in extremist 
ideology,” [in Arabic] Al Quds, December 26, 2018 (accessed />وزي ار-لداخلي ةا-لمغربي-قضي ة-مقت ال-لسائ<https://www.alquds.co.uk/ 2019). 15, May
63 Abdelhak Khiame, “On a évité le pire,” interview with L’Observateur, January 11-17, 2019, p. 14-17.
64 M. Tozy, “Des oulémas frondeurs à la bureaucratie du “croire”: les péripéties d’une restructuration annoncée du champ religieux au Maroc,” in B. Hibou 
(ed.), La Bureaucratisation néolibérale (Paris, 2013), p. 132.
65 D. Maghraoui, “The Strengths and Limits of Religious Reforms in Morocco,” Mediterranean Politics 14:2 (2009), pp. 195-211.
and ideologies associated with Wahabism or Salafi 
Jihadism.
The Key Contents of Moroccan Religion-Based PVE 
(MRPVE)
MRPVE stems from the state’s vision of the necessity 
to strengthen the Commandership of the Faithful’s 
religious legitimacy and preserve the country’s spiri-
tual identity. In the aftermath of the 2003 Casablanca 
attacks, enormous efforts were made to reshape the 
official version of Islam, to strengthen the religious 
bureaucracy’s central role, and to extend its reach in 
firm compliance with official directions. This vision 
aims, inter alia, to enable the state to assume its 
responsibility as a key player in “Islamization from 
above,” safeguard “spiritual security,” and immunize 
Morocco’s religious constants (al-thawabit) against 
all “threatening” opponents, including Islamist move-
ments, Salafists (quietist and jihadist), Shiites, and 
Christian proselytizing missionaries.65
Three major official religious institutions are engaged 
in carrying out this vision: the Ministry of Islamic 
Affairs, the Ulama Councils, and the Mohammadian 
Rabita of Religious Scholars. Such an engagement is 
supposed to proceed, theoretically speaking, with 
a sort of collaborative coordination and horizontal 
“division of labor” among these institutions while 
respecting their particular roles.
Overall, the efforts and initiatives undertaken by 
these institutions can be summarized into three main 
areas. First is the intensive religious supervision of 
society in compliance with the doctrinal choices of 
“Moroccan Islam” (Maliki jurisprudence, Ash’ari doc-
trine, and Sunni Sufism) and its specificities marked 
by tolerance and moderation. Following a proximi-
ty-based approach, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs 
oversees religious supervision and provides religious 
services and adequate equipment so that people 
practice their faith in appropriate conditions. The 
Ministry also makes every effort to place mosques 
and preaching sites under tight control of state 
authorities.
The second area is the monopolization of entry and 
credentials to acquire religious authority – speaking 
in the name of Islam – via the regulation of institu-
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tional channels used to transmit religious knowl-
edge and normative values in society. This includes 
the institutionalization of the issuance of fatwa, the 
training of a new generation of imams and female 
guides (Murshidat), and the upgrading and revision of 
religious programs and curricula in traditional edu-
cation and public schools.66
Third is the involvement, even belatedly, in de-rad-
icalization and immunization efforts, through an 
intellectual engagement with the rhetoric and ide-
ologies of violent extremism and the promotion of 
moderate Islam in academia, the media, and online. 
The Mohammedian Rabita of Moroccan Ulema (Arra-
bita) has made a distinguished contribution in this 
regard, by targeting areas commonly deemed the 
“front-lines” and that are the most vulnerable to 
violent extremism. Arrabita adopts a two-pronged 
approach: the first focuses in general on elaborating 
“safe” religious contents, while the second produces 
counter-extremism narratives aimed at dismantling 
the core foundations underpinning jihadist ideolo-
gies67 and helping to “immunize” society against the 
rhetoric of violent extremism. To distinguish itself 
from other religious institutions, Arrabita’s discourse 
frequently uses the term “immunization” (al-tamni’) 
instead of “prevention” (al-tahsine). “Immunization” 
is essentially a much more efficient and sustainable 
approach than “prevention.”68 The former term refers 
to the act of individuals acquiring an internal resil-
ience against all forms of threats, while the latter is 
confined to defensive protection by means of pre-
cautionary measures.
66 A. M. Wainscott, Bureaucratizing Islam: Morocco and the War on Terror (New York, 2017), pp. 158-179.
67 A. Abbadi, Fi tafkik khitab al-tatarruf (Rabat, 2018). See the collection of booklets “Dafatir tafkik khitab al-tatarruf,” which deal with the notions of 
“Jiziya,” “Jihad,” “Hakimiya,” “al-qital fi sabil allah,” “mina al-khilafa ila al-dawla,” and “al-dawla al-islamiya.” Arrabita has also published, under the same title 
Tafkik Khitab al-tatarruf (2018), the proceedings of an international conference organized in collaboration with the Muslim World League.
68 Author’s interview with a senior researcher at Arrabita, November 2018.
69 DGAPR, Annual Activities Report 2017 [in Arabic] (Rabat: 2018), p. 55.
70 Ibid.
71 Online platforms such as “al-Raid,” “Chabab.ma,” and www.alfetra.ma.
72 O. Sara, “La Rabita Mohammedia des oulémas lance un site pour lutter contre l’extrémisme,” TelQuel, October 1, 2017 <https://telquel.
ma/2017/01/10/rabita-mohammedia-oulemas-lance-site-lutter-contre-discours-extremiste_1530585> (accessed May 15, 2019).
The Barnamaj Musalaha (Reconciliation Program), 
initially launched in May 2017 in partnership between 
the General Delegation for Prison Administration and 
Reintegration (DGAPR), Arrabita, and the National 
Council for Human Rights (CNDH), remains thus far 
the most prominent example in the field of de-rad-
icalization and rehabilitation. The Mussalaha Pro-
gram aims at reconciling convicted jihadists with the 
“Self,” “with the religious text,” and “with society.”69 
It covers four areas. The first concerns the religious 
aspect intended to assure a “good understanding” 
and “assimilation” of the sacred texts. The second 
axis, related to human rights, aims at informing 
participants about the legal framework governing 
interactions within society and about their rights 
and obligations. The third axis concerns provision of 
rehabilitation and psychological support. The fourth 
axis focuses mainly on socio-economic rehabilita-
tion. The purpose of the program is to facilitate “the 
full, effective reintegration of extremist prisoners 
into society.” 70
In addition to Mussalaha, Arrabita has launched 
other immunization and rehabilitation programs to 
“vaccinate” teenagers and youths, empower vulnera-
ble groups, and rehabilitate prisoners in the realm of 
public rights. They use innovative approaches such 
as peer-to-peer education and competency building 
methods, including educational support and spiri-
tual counselling in prisons, sensitization campaigns 
and capacity building trainings in schools and frag-
ile neighborhoods. Digital interactive platforms and 
intervention in the virtual media sphere are also part 
of the program.71 The aim is to deconstruct mislead-
ing and extremist speeches broadcast on the internet 
and social media through producing an “alternative 
content based on the values and constants of the 
Moroccan nation.”72
Moroccan Religion-based PVE Strategy: A Primary 
Assessment
Due to the overlapping aspects of the holistic, com-
prehensive Moroccan counterterrorism strategy, 
it is difficult to assess accurately the porous lines 
between the religion-based strategy’s effective-
After 2003, efforts were 
made to reshape the official 
version of Islam 
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ness and the security services’ constant vigilance 
and intelligence performance. It therefore remains 
unclear to what extent they complement, cover, or 
hide each other’s weaknesses and shortcomings. Put-
ting this issue aside, three main criteria can be used 
to assess the functioning and outputs of this reli-
gion-based strategy.
MRPVE’s Ideological Vision and its Political Use
MRPVE is built upon an ideological vision that stems 
from the pillars of Moroccan Islam73 and endeavors to 
unify, from the top, the doctrinal bases of Moroccan 
religious identity. In fact, this can be seen as a kind of 
dominance and a step towards restricting the plural-
istic nature of the Moroccan religious fabric, which 
is not as entirely cohesive and inclusive as official 
political discourse pretends it is, when considering 
the individual and popular patterns of locally prac-
ticed religiosity.
Like many political regimes in the MENA region, 
Morocco has attempted to exploit the anxiety gen-
erated by terrorist threats since September 2001 in 
order to achieve political goals of an authoritarian 
nature.74 In overseeing MRPVE, the religious estab-
lishment’s ultimate goal moves beyond the fight 
against terror to achieve political goals such as mar-
ginalizing religious actors and silencing the opposi-
tion and social movements that criticize the status 
quo and demand greater power-sharing and reform 
of the existing political system. On the other hand, 
placing the “fight against extremism” as the cen-
tral priority of ongoing religious policy covers other 
stakes and issues of no less importance, such as the 
political use of religion as a positive catalyst or hand-
icap to the process of democratization and modern-
ization in Morocco.75 The positions taken respectively 
by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and the Highest 
Council of Ulama during the 2011 Constitution ref-
erendum and Hirak al-Rif (2016)76 are two indicative 
moments, among many others, that reveal how the 
Moroccan regime uses official Islam to discredit pop-
ular protests and take control over the ongoing post-
2011 political dynamics.
73 Tozy, “Des oulémas frondeurs.”
74 Wainscott, Bureaucratizing Islam.
75 For further insights on this point, see S. Hmimnat, The Religious Policy in Morocco (1984-2002): State Fundamentalism and Authoritarian Modernization 
[in Arabic] (Casablanca, 2018).
76 M. Monjib, “The Relentless Tide of Morocco’s Rif Protests,” Sada Journal, June 21, 2017 <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/71331> (accessed May 
15, 2019).
77 DGAPR, Annual Activities Report, p. 56.
78 Author interview with Naoufal Abboud, February 2019.
Although it is too early to make a sound assessment 
of the Mussalaha program’s potential effectiveness 
and impacts, based on its two sessions held in 2017 
and 2018, it can be said that this deradicalization 
program is not all-encompassing. It started with a 
limited number of people convicted on terrorism and 
extremism charges: out of 1,000 prisoners, no more 
than fifty inmates have been allowed to participate 
so far. All the participants were carefully selected by 
the penitentiary administration based on their “free 
choice” and the determination to represent various 
jihadist streams.77 The fact that a royal pardon was 
offered to 36 alumni of the program (14 in 2017 and 
22 in 2018) can be seen as a reassuring sign to extend 
the reach of the program to larger numbers of Jihadi 
inmates. In contrast, linking participation in the pro-
gram with the privilege of receiving immediate royal 
pardon can hinder the principal concept framing this 
program and questions its credibility.
Taking into consideration the conditions in which 
inmates are forced to live, one might argue that this 
endeavor would be a violation of the freedoms of 
thought and conscience. Self-reconciliation is known 
to be a long evolving process that should be under-
taken beyond any institutional constraint or forced 
conditions. As one conflict resolution expert puts 
it, “it is problematic to bring a psychologist to erase 
thoughts and convictions from a human’s mind in 
order to supplant new (pro-state) ones.”78
Reconciliation with the “sacred text” is another con-
troversial issue. Jihadist inmates have problems relat-
ing to certain interpretations of religion rather than 
with the text itself. In fact, all the religious scholars 
involved as leaders in Mussalaha belong to the official 
Morocco has tried to use 
the fear of terrorism for 
political purposes
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religious establishment. This means that the clear 
intention is to champion the state’s interpretation of 
Islam over other individualistic, Salafi interpretations. 
However, the issue resides not in the religious inter-
pretation per se, but rather in a certain dogmatic 
understanding of Islam that can lead to violent acts.79
The third issue concerns “reconciliation with soci-
ety.” In principle, society can be represented in many 
different ways including the parliament, civil society, 
and representatives of the victims or their families. 
This kind of reconciliation thus remains meaning-
less unless all or some of those key social or politi-
cal groups are involved in the enterprise. While state 
institutions take a significant role in the ongoing 
program,80 it is surprising to note that many soci-
etal stakeholders were completely marginalized. For 
example, a Muraja’at (dialog) program was initiated 
in prison between 2006-2010 by a group of Jihadist 
ideologues including Abu Hafs and others who were 
later released,81 and provided a viable path for build-
ing a credible national reconciliation between the 
state, the Salafi Jihadists, and the families of victims 
of terrorist acts. However, it is surprising to note 
that none of Muraja’at’s leaders were included in 
Musalaha program.
Accordingly, having embedded the program in a 
transitional justice context in a country experienc-
ing “permanent” democratic transition since the 
early 1990s, it can be argued that Mussalaha does not 
really offer a radically different alternative to vio-
lent extremism. It just creates a new context for the 
Moroccan state in which the issue is merely: “how to 
renew the state’s legitimacy and maintain autocracy, 
without resorting to the illegitimate violence of the 
past.”82
Coordination Between Institutions Involved in 
MRPVE Implementation
MRPVE relies on a well-structured religious bureau-
cracy that consists of the three official religious 
institutions cited above. Each of these institutions 
presides over enormous human resources, material 
resources, and significant practical experience that 
allow them to operate on multiple fronts and target 
79 Ibid.
80 Beside the DGAPD, Arrabita, and CNDH, the second version of Mussalaha program includes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Human Rights, the 
Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Habous and Islamic Affairs, the Supreme Court for the Judiciary, the Presidium of the Public Prosecution Service, and the 
Mohammed VI Foundation for the Reintegration of Prisoners.
81 S. Hmimnat, “The Moroccan State and the dialogue with the Salafist jihadist prisoners,” [in Arabic] in M. Monjib (ed.): Debates between Islamists and 
Laïcs in Morocco (IKV & Centre Averroès, 2008), p. 127-143.
82 “Abdelhay Moudden (Dialogue avec),” in F. Ait Mous and D. Ksikes, Le métier d’intellectuel (Casablanca, 2014), p. 313.
83 M. Zeghal, Les islamistes marocains : le défi à la monarchie (Casablanca, 2005).
large segments of Moroccan society. While this insti-
tutional pluralism can be seen as positive in bring-
ing multidimensional support for MRPVE, several 
problems arise concerning the complementarity and 
presumed coordination among the aforementioned 
institutions.
The religious institutions involved in MRPVE are 
supposed to operate with a “functional integration” 
and close coordination under the umbrella of the 
Commander of the Faithful. In fact, a sort of silent, 
implicit competition has been observed among these 
institutions. It seems that the regime manages the 
religious field in line with the same strategy of frag-
mentation – a policy pursued since 1956 – in order to 
ensure a balance between different religious actors 
so that none would pose a potential threat to the 
regime itself.83 This lack of coordination, however, 
weakens the strength of MRPVE and challenges its 
effectiveness in the field.
MRPVE’s outreach and scope of action
Apart the bold initiatives undertaken by Arrabita, 
the other religious institutions do not reach or may 
not have the appropriate tools to deal with hot spots 
where Jihadist groups manage to disseminate violent 
ideas and recruit potential extremists. The scope of 
action covered by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and 
the Ulama Councils is limited to mosques and the 
state-sponsored TV channels and radio (al-Ssadissa), 
even though the radicalization process is known to 
operate and flourish elsewhere, especially on social 
media and in prisons where sophisticated communi-
cation strategies are used to recruit individuals. 
Three further challenges are worth highlighting, 
since they are likely to affect the MRPVE’s efficacy 
negatively. First, religious institutions lack the inter-
nal tools and indicators to measure their effective-
ness and capacity to reach the desired results. The 
Mitaq al-Ulama charter of scholars is a perfect exam-
ple that reflects this deficiency. Second, a significant 
part of official religious discourse is still immersed 
in traditional advocacy and religious guidance, which 
remains less influential and less interesting, either 
in form or in content, to the current generation of 
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young people. Third, official religious discourse and 
all state-sponsored initiatives in general are regarded 
cautiously by the populace for lacking credibility.
Recommendations
 - Morocco should consider creating an intergovern-
mental body to ensure coordination between state 
and non-state institutions
Such an institution, for instance an inter-ministerial 
delegate, should ensure coordination on a permanent 
and day-to-day basis, synergizing the fragmented 
activities of state and non-state institutions, bringing 
together their efforts and resources into a unified, 
well-coordinated, and monitored action agenda in 
the field of PVE. Furthermore, the available practi-
cal knowledge on the Moroccan experience should 
be officially documented, including the basic political 
vision and conceptual framework, and the different 
axes, plans, and actors involved in the implemen-
tation of the PVE strategy (including the religious 
establishment). Instead of occasional and dispersed 
statements by state officials, this intergovernmen-
tal body would gather and formulate all those pro-
grams, actions, and best practices that constitute the 
Moroccan experience in this area into a “white book.” 
This would help to raise its visibility at international 
level and help upgrade its core elements, if needed.
 - Religious associations and volunteer scholars 
should be involved and provided with the appro-
priate training and opportunities to maximize the 
MRPVE’s efficacy and effectiveness
In parallel to the efforts made by state-run religious 
institutions, independent religious clerics and mod-
erate Islamist associations should be provided with a 
margin of action, which would ultimately strengthen 
and corroborate MRPVE.
 - State-run religious institutions should develop 
internal indicators to assess objectively the impacts 
of MRPVE measures, plans, and programs
PVE programs run in mosques and elsewhere need 
to show greater interest in assessing their real out-
comes and impacts. There are a few exceptions, such 
as the Musalaha program, which measures impact 
and assesses prison inmates’ responsiveness based 
on “accurate scientific indicators” and “experimen-
tal tests,”84 to determine the degree of their disen-
84 DGAPR, Annual Activities Report, p. 57.
gagement and behavioral recovery from extremist 
discourse.
 - Observatories, think tanks, or any other collabo-
rative initiatives that bring together policymakers, 
practitioners, and researchers working on PVE, and 
other stakeholders, should be established
Currently, local scholars and specialists in PVE mostly 
find themselves in the dark concerning practical 
knowledge on the topic, as they lack first-hand data 
and credible figures to substantiate their research 
and studies. Such an initiative would provide an 
appropriate space to foster the exchange of insights, 
contrast different theoretical and practical expertise, 
and, hopefully, produce concerted alternative PVE 
measures that would inform decision makers and 
policy-making.
Salim Hmimnat is a research fellow at the Insti-
tute of African Studies (IEA) at Mohammed V 
University, Rabat, Morocco.
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PREVENTING AND COUNTERING 
VIOLENT EXTREMISMM – THE 
ROLE OF LOCAL COMMUNITY 
BROADCASTING
Hamdi Echkaou
Preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) 
have become urgent concerns in the consolidation of 
social development and security in North Africa and 
the Sahel regions. Morocco uses multiple outlets to 
project its comprehensive policy of dismantling rad-
icalization and terrorist narratives that engender 
violent actions. With youth access to media broadcast-
ing tools increasing, participatory community radio 
provides an advanced platform for citizens’ engage-
ment in sharing news, following ongoing events, and 
most importantly, preventing and countering violent 
extremism and radicalization attempts. In this context, 
a community radio broadcasting approach to P/CVE is 
required to engender new attitudes of interaction that 
can adapt to the topics being aired and the community 
being targeted.
The Moroccan policy of both countering and pre-
venting violent extremism (C/PVE)85 aims to con-
solidate the existing approach to de-radicalization.86 
The country’s communication landscape is increas-
ingly gravitating towards alternative media as tools 
for broadcasting and voicing peoples’ demands and 
realities. Community radios are an emerging media 
described as al ithāʿāt al jamʿawiyyah or al jamāʿati-
yyah, associative radios. Within the changing media 
landscape, community radios help nurture a culture 
of civic engagement by addressing neighborhood 
issues, marginalized groups (including youth, women, 
and ethnic minorities), social and economic repres-
sion, poverty, and the lack of resources.
Ideologically-motivated violence often flourishes 
in communities and neighborhoods with very lim-
ited prospects for development. Raising awareness 
about the threats of extremism and violent nar-
ratives requires the constant engagement of local 
broadcasting media. A few community radio stations, 
locally termed Al ithāʿāt al jamʿawiyyah or al jamāʿa-
tiyyah,87 broadcast in different regions of Morocco, 
85 “The ‘Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism’ Approach: A Guidance Note for National Societies,” International Committee of the Red Cross, July 
19, 2017 <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/guidance-note-national-societies-preventing-and-countering-violent-extremism-approach> (accessed June 
19, 2019).
86 Other examples of the comprehensive approach include governance, security, and development. See the policing approach in Radicalization that Lead 
to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach, OSCE, Vienna, 2014 <https://www.osce.org/atu/111438> (accessed May 31, 2019).
87 The transliteration is based on the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies chart <https://ijmes.chass.ncsu.edu/docs/TransChart.pdf> (accessed 
May 31, 2019).
88 Radio Sawt Ouarzazate, Facebook page <https://www.facebook.com/sawtozte/> (accessed June 19, 2019).
89 Izrfan Web Radio, Facebook page <https://www.facebook.com/izrfanradio/> (accessed June 19, 2019).
covering mostly regional news, but their purpose is 
not to counter violent extremism. The case stud-
ies of the three stations Sawt Ouarzazate, Izrfan 
Radio, and 100% Mamans Tanger demonstrate how 
community radio can strengthen the community of 
listeners through broadcast content. With limited 
broadcasting hardware and software, these radios 
establish safe spaces for participation at an intellec-
tual level appropriate to their listeners. All three have 
gained popularity for their accessible, interactive, 
and low-budget broadcasting across all age groups 
in their respective regions. Each channel actively 
encourages feedback and interaction with listeners 
on local and daily community concerns.
Examples of the Existing Moroccan Community 
Radio Landscape
Community radio stations are characterized by their 
active role in associative engagement, addressing 
social topics of development, youth issues, minority 
exclusion, radical extremism, and cultural enhance-
ment. By linking entertainment with a serious 
cause and practicing and promoting the benefits of 
exchange, radios can increase their audience and 
influence.
Existing community radios center a great deal of 
their participation around the cultural and linguis-
tic needs of under-represented communities such as 
the Amazigh (indigenous peoples across North Africa, 
also referred to as Berbers). Stations such as Izrfan 
Radio and Radio Sawt Ouarzazate depict the eth-
nic, linguistic, and cultural reality of the country at 
the same time as demanding fair representation for 
marginalized groups. Sawt Ouarzazate, a web radio 
station,88 focuses on listener discussions of local 
and southern issues, in particular education, infra-
structure, and the need for responsible government 
intervention. Izrfan Radio89 pursues a more artistic 
approach, promoting the musical, linguistic, and 
cultural diversity of the Amazigh community. Sim-
ilarly, Radio Imazighen also uses music as a bridge 
to connect communities both at home and abroad. 
Phone-in programs are also a popular means of 
allowing listeners to reflect on their culture and pro-
pose ways to promote it.
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The best example of community radio is 100% 
Mamans Tanger (100 Percent Tangiers Mothers),90 
which focuses on single mothers in Morocco, a topic 
that is still taboo in some regions. Originating from 
the non-profit organization 100% Mamans Tanger, 
this platform actively challenges stereotypical judge-
ments of women by creating the space for dynamic 
interaction on civil society topics. The radio station 
promotes events including fundraising, international 
and national days for women and children, and offi-
cial visits from ambassadors and other international 
organizations. It also relays positive media coverage 
of the station’s own activities. Furthermore, online 
sessions allow single mothers to access legal support 
in court cases. This grassroots-based station pro-
motes legal reforms to improve women’s rights, pro-
mote events, and organize national and international 
advocacy meetings. In effect, this has created a new 
forum for single mothers to express themselves and 
pressure the government into paying more attention 
to their concerns.
The Impact of Community Radios on Changing 
Listener Attitudes
By placing community interests and issues at the 
center of their programming, community radio opens 
up new possibilities for social interaction and co-ex-
istence, which can help transform both individual 
and group attitudes through broadcast and online 
discussion to broaden debate and regional knowl-
edge, and play a role in P/CVE.
Importantly, community radios can foster self-ex-
pression and self-criticism. The three stations 
mentioned above show how radio has provided an 
alternative channel to voice smaller groups’ daily 
concerns. The listener is no longer a mere receiver, 
but rather the producer of information for commu-
nity radio, which can improve its audience’s self-ex-
pression capacities and allow underrepresented 
voices to be heard and demand change. For vulner-
able groups often subjected to violent narratives, a 
broadcasting platform can help transform the envi-
ronment and provide psychological support, as seen 
in the case of the single mothers’ radio station.
Community radio also provides an opportunity for 
self-criticism: when audiences can learn from one 
another, hear others’ stories, discuss, and argue, they 
can also address the pitfalls in their own communi-
ties and neighborhoods, and seek solutions. In effect, 
90 100% Mamans Tanger, Facebook page <https://www.facebook.com/centpourcentmamans.tanger/> (accessed June 19, 2019).
this transfers responsibility from government to the 
local community itself, through a genuine form of 
interaction between radio station and audience. This 
can open up possibilities for constructive discussion 
of serious, pertinent topics, while at the same time 
giving space and microphone time to people who 
never thought their contributions would be heard, let 
alone brought to the attention of the national public. 
For example, Sawt Ouarzazate, based in a city in the 
south east, has succeeded in bringing local commu-
nity struggles and recommendations to the attention 
of local policy makers.
In addition, community radio can serve as a means to 
foster solidarity and tolerance. In general, commu-
nity radios can foster solidarity within and beyond 
communities by sharing local realities and chal-
lenges such as the lack of development projects. 
Through involving audiences from other regions, 
organizing fundraising events, and collaborating 
with local authorities, community radios can effec-
tively improve their communities through shared 
good practices. A review of the three radio stations’ 
broadcast content and audience online comments 
confirms how listeners appreciate the reiteration of 
their experiences via radio, and how broadcast con-
tent contributes to consolidating their community. 
Recommendations
A form of alternative media, community radio needs 
to function as a supporting platform for community 
consolidation and safety, partnering with local and 
national authorities where possible to bring about 
change. A community radio broadcasting approach to 
P/CVE engenders new attitudes towards interaction 
specific to the topics being aired and the community 
being targeted.
Community radios 
 greatly consider the needs 
of  under-represented 
 communities
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 - Set up a community radio with a clear focus on P/
CVE
Such community radios should be established in 
areas with high recruitment levels for violent radi-
cal groups. Granting communities the opportunity to 
air and record their voices and concerns at both an 
individual and group level allows for the promotion of 
values such as respect, tolerance, and mutual under-
standing as key determinants in social transforma-
tion, and as shields against radical tendencies within 
the local communities where those radios function. 
In addition, it would provide a welcoming space for 
locals as participants in discussions, in which views 
on social, religious, cultural, and ritual issues can be 
aired and effectively challenged.
The P/CVE content of such programs should meet 
the demands and expectations of the listeners as a 
community and initiate difficult dialogs on taboo 
topics. Community radio platforms need to engage 
religious imams, leaders, preachers, and ex-affiliates 
of terrorist groups. This would provide insights into 
the early features of radicalism and help mobilize 
against ideologies that may be increasingly popular 
in local neighborhoods, and which may lead to future 
violent actions. Phone-in programs can further allow 
listeners to reflect upon counterterrorist measures 
that make them uneasy, thus fostering understand-
ing between the local community and the authori-
ties. Community radio stations can also publicize 
jobs for youth, promote opportunities elsewhere, 
and counter the inertia that increases the chance of 
youth being snatched up by radical violent extrem-
ists.
 - Use community radio to support local authorities
Community radio can take a P/CVE role framed by 
cooperative support and governmental assistance to 
overcome inconsistent coverage. By reporting local 
abuses and aggression, community radio stations 
can assist the local authorities to establish stable and 
safe conditions, instead of mere police supervision 
and control. Radio stations can function as platforms 
to equip and empower the community against nar-
ratives that support violent extremist attitudes, and 
also encourage discussions between factions con-
cerning drugs, religious extremism, and pressing 
human rights issues, notwithstanding the radio sta-
tions’ lack of resources.
 - Learn from international organizations
Coordinating international models of training and 
support should also be pursued to maintain commu-
nity radios’ ability to address pressing topics such as 
radical extremism.
Hamdi Echkaou is a teaching associate at Indiana 
University of Pennsylvania, USA. Starting in 2020, 
he will serve as the chair of the Global Communi-
cations Program at the American College Casa-
blanca, Morocco.  
Community radios can 
 foster self-expression and 
self-criticism
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STREAMLINING MOROCCAN “SOFT” 
SECURITY IN SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA – INCLUSION IS KEY
Žilvinas Švedkauskas1
As Moroccan foreign policy undertakes a political 
and economic “shift to Africa,” the transnational her-
itage of Sufism has been actively employed as a tool 
of “religious diplomacy.” The Moroccan monarchy is 
tapping into Sufi networks connecting Morocco and 
Sub-Saharan Africa not only to promote its formula 
of “moderate Islam,” but also to establish King Moham-
med VI’s authority both at home and abroad. European 
policymakers, seeking sustainable security measures in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, should support this engagement 
of the Moroccan government, but remain cautious of 
the authoritarian side-effects.
A recent report by the European Court of Auditors 
has concluded that EU support for the African Peace 
and Security Architecture (APSA), the overarching set 
of institutions, legislation, and procedures for con-
flict prevention of the African Union (AU), has not 
been disbursed effectively.2 European support for 
the APSA has increased the AU’s role as Africa’s lead-
ing organization in the field of security. However, EU 
allowances have long been used to cover basic opera-
tional costs rather than capacity-building, and lack a 
long-term strategy, failing to transfer the ownership 
of APSA to the AU and ten mandated sub-regional 
organizations. Moreover, analysts have also criticized 
the prioritization of military solutions by APSA, which 
are perceived as being pushed by European donors 
seeking to seal their southern borders. For exam-
ple, the deployment of around 20,000 multinational 
troops in the Sahel in 2017 to fight Islamist insurgents 
was seen by many as disproportional, jeopardizing 
and encouraging further radicalization of local pop-
ulations.
Some have made alternative suggestions, calling for 
the EU to support “soft” security measures in line 
with its commitment to the security-development 
1 The author would like to thank organizers and participants of the DGAP workshop on the promotion of think tank work on Morocco for their valuable 
comments on the draft versions this paper. In particular, thanks to Dina Fakoussa, Laura Kabis-Kechrid, Tonja Klaussman and Dr. Salim Hmimnat.
2 European Court of Auditors, “The African Peace and Security Architecture: need to refocus EU support,” Special report no. 20, 2018 <https://www.eca.
europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR18_20/SR_APS_EN.pdf> [sign-in required].
3 Bernardo Venturi, “The EU and the Sahel: A Laboratory of Experimentation for the Security–Migration–Development Nexus,” IAI Working Papers 17/38 
(December 2017). <https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiwp1738.pdf> (accessed May 17, 2019).
4 Anthony Dworkin and Fatim-Zohra El Malki, “The southern front line: EU counter-terrorism cooperation with Tunisia and Morocco,” European Council 
on Foreign Relations, 2018 <https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/the_southern_front_line_eu_counter_terrorism_cooperation> (accessed May 17, 
2019).
5 Vish Sakthivel, “Morocco’s New Africa Policy? The African Union, Algeria, and Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 
22, 2016 <https://www.fpri.org/2016/07/moroccos-new-africa-policy/> (accessed May 17, 2019).
6 Nizar Messari, “Morocco’s African Foreign Policy,” MENARA Future Notes 12 (June 2018) <http://www.menaraproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/
menara_fn_12.pdf> (accessed May 17, 2019).
nexus enshrined in strategic documents on Africa-EU 
cooperation.3 Assistance for local processes of peace, 
mediation, facilitation, and reconciliation, backed by 
local religious and political leaders, could be more 
effective in the long run than the prevailing “hard” 
security paradigm. In the light of these suggestions, 
the evolving pro-active security cooperation between 
the Kingdom of Morocco and some African countries 
has already received significant attention.
Morocco has long marketed itself as a regional cham-
pion of political stability and counter-terrorism. Its 
“soft” security approach is defined by state domi-
nance in the domestic religious sphere, based on the 
presumed religious legitimacy of the Moroccan mon-
archy and a long-standing tradition of peaceful Sufi 
Islam.4 In international acknowledgment of its suc-
cess defusing security threats, since 2016, Morocco 
has co-chaired the Global Counterterrorism Forum, 
and a number of European countries, including Italy, 
Spain, and Belgium, have reached out to Moroccan 
authorities, with a view to cooperating in areas of 
religious education and counter-extremism. None-
theless, the undemocratic nature of the evolving 
Moroccan engagement with Africa, transposing its 
“soft” security southwards, may be a serious spoiler.
Moroccan Africa Policy as Domaine Reservé
In 2017, to the surprise of many, Morocco ended 
its 33-year “empty-chair” policy at the AU, and in 
October 2018, submitted its bid to join Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The 
ambition to play a role in these transnational Afri-
can institutions sums up the trajectory of Moroccan 
foreign policy under King Mohammed VI. Unlike his 
father King Hassan II, who focused on the Middle 
East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the current 
King aims to diversify Morocco’s partnerships and 
establish the Kingdom as a vital link between the 
EU and Sub-Saharan Africa.5 Since his accession to 
the throne in 1999, Mohammed VI has spent a lot of 
his time on a “charm offensive” travelling around the 
continent.6 By mid-2018, he had made over 51 visits 
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to 26 African states and signed nearly one thousand 
bilateral agreements, presenting these initiatives as 
an expression of mutually beneficial South-South 
cooperation.7
This has borne fruit. Between 2000 and 2015, the 
annual growth of trade between Morocco and 
Sub-Saharan Africa reached 12.8 percent.8 From 
2006 to 2016, 85 percent of Morocco’s outward for-
eign direct investments (FDI) went to Africa and were 
concentrated in sectors such as banking, telecom-
munications, and energy.9 Nonetheless, as an indica-
tor of the deep-running cronyism of this expansion, 
companies such as Maroc Télécom, Attijariwafa Bank, 
BMCE Bank, BCP Bank, OCP Group, and Royal Air 
Maroc, with shares held by the Moroccan royal family 
via the Al Mada investment group and its subsidiaries, 
have been among the main Moroccan investors in the 
continent.10
Royal ownership of Moroccan Africa policy is further 
evident in the manner with which diplomatic rela-
tions with Sub-Saharan Africa have been nourished. 
Counter to the spirit of the 2011 Constitution, which 
broadened the powers of the government vis-à-vis 
the royal palace, members of the “ruling” Islamist Jus-
tice and Development Party (PJD) have been involved 
neither in the formulation, nor in the implementation 
of Moroccan Africa policies.11 For instance, intense 
negotiations on Morocco’s return to the AU were 
undertaken in the second half of 2016, in the face of a 
legislative deadlock following the October 2016 elec-
tions. The legislative paralysis was only briefly inter-
rupted on January 16, 2017, when the royal palace 
needed parliamentary approval of the law pertaining 
to the AU’s constituent act.12
Furthermore, in his numerous visits to African capi-
tals, the King has been accompanied by technocrats 
and managers of royal corporations rather than 
elected politicians. This entourage has included fig-
ures such as advisors to the King, Fouad Ali El Himma 
7 Rim Berahab, “Relations between Morocco and sub-Saharan Africa: What is the potential for trade and foreign direct investment?,” OCP Policy Center, 
2017 <http://www.ocppc.ma/sites/default/files/OCPPC-PB1704vEn.pdf> (accessed May 17, 2019).
8 Maghreb Arabe Presse, “Message de SM le Roi adresse aux participants au Forum Crans Montana de Dakhla,” press release, March 18, 2016 <www.
maroc.ma/fr/discours-royaux/sm-le-roi-adresse-un-message-aux-participants-au-forum-crans-montana-de-dakhla> (accessed May 17, 2019).
9 African Development Bank Group, “Morocco in Line with AfDB’s High 5s,” press release, July 22, 2016 <https://allafrica.com/stories/201607221044.
html> (accessed May 17, 2019).
10 The North Africa Post, “Morocco’s SNI Changes Name into Al Mada, Gears Activity to Africa,” March 28, 2018 <http://northafricapost.com/22909-
moroccos-sni-changes-name-al-mada-gears-activity-africa.html> (accessed May 17, 2019).
11 Yasmina Abouzzohour and Beatriz Tomé-Alonso, “Moroccan foreign policy after the Arab Spring: a turn for the Islamists or persistence of royal 
leadership?,” The Journal of North African Studies 22, no. 3 (2018), pp. 1–24 <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2018.1454652> (accessed May 17, 2019).
12 Miguel Hernando de Larramendi and Beatriz Tomé-Alonso, “The Return of Morocco to the African Union,” IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2017, pp. 
229–32 <https://www.iemed.org/observatori/arees-danalisi/arxius-adjunts/anuari/med.2017/IEMed_MedYearbook2017_morocco_african_union_
Larramendi_alonso.pdf/> (accessed May 17, 2019).
13 Fait Muedini, Sponsoring Sufism: How Governments Promote Mystical Islam in their Domestic and Foreign Policies, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, 
and Policy (New York, 2015) <http://gbv.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=4001933> (accessed May 17, 2019).
14 Rachida Chih, “Sufism, education and politics in contemporary Morocco,” Journal for Islamic Studies 32, no. 1 (2012), pp. 24-46.
and Yassir Zenagui, the technocratic Ministers of 
Foreign and Islamic Affairs, Nasser Bourita and 
Ahmed Toufiq, as well as some loyal independents 
and members of pro-palace political parties. Thus, 
by excluding the ruling Islamist party and manipulat-
ing the legislature to rubberstamp its “shift to Africa,” 
the Moroccan monarchy has effectively distanced 
the elected government from foreign policy-making 
and insisted that, despite a façade of political reforms 
undertaken during the Arab Spring, it remains a royal 
domaine reservé.
Inherent Risks of Moroccan “Soft” Security
In order to legitimize and facilitate new-found 
pan-Africanism at home and abroad, the Moroccan 
monarchy has mobilized its religious “soft” power 
and transnational networks of Sufi groups, already 
co-opted at the domestic level and offering an effec-
tive link southward. Morocco boasts a rich history 
of Islamic Sufi mysticism, practiced by hierarchi-
cal Sufi brotherhoods. The Budshishiyya, Tijaniyya, 
 Darqawiyya, and Shadhili are just some of those 
successfully functioning up to this day. Historically, 
Sufi organizations existed as politically autonomous 
or even oppositional entities.13 However, religious 
centralization carried out under Hassan II brought 
Moroccan Sufism under state supervision.14
Morocco’s “soft” security is 
defined by state dominance 
in the religious sphere
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Under Mohammed VI, Sufism as an integral part of 
the discourse on moderate Moroccan Islam came to 
serve as a cornerstone of the country’s antiterrorism 
strategy, successfully advertised on a global stage.15 
In July 2003, the traditional Throne Day speech was 
used by the King to denounce the recent terrorist 
attacks in Casablanca, carried out by the homegrown 
terrorist group Salafia Jihadia. He further called for 
religious reforms in the Kingdom and unilaterally 
declared Sufism as one of the three “cornerstones” of 
Moroccan Islam (together with adherence to Maliki 
school of Islamic law and Ash’ari theology).16 The 
fourth informal “ingredient” of the Moroccan reli-
gious formula has been enshrined in the country’s 
constitution since 1962 and awards the King with 
the title of Amir al-Muʾminin or “the commander 
of the faithful,” reflecting the belief that the Alaouite 
dynasty has a blood link with the Prophet Muham-
mad. Even though the actual relevance of the title is 
contentious, historically, it has been regularly instru-
mentalized to portray the monarchy as “the key insti-
tution of the Moroccan religious system.17”
From an institutional point of view, the Moroccan 
monarchy acts as a patron of Sufi brotherhoods and 
rewards sheiks and their families, who are respon-
sible for administrating the budgets of their organi-
zations. In return, in some areas less penetrated by 
the state, Sufi orders may act as a sort of an institu-
tional substitute, functioning as local multifunctional 
centers of education, family advice, or arbitration in 
local disputes.18 The paramount example of domestic 
cohabitation between Sufi groups and the Moroccan 
monarchy is evident in the special treatment given 
to the Budshishiyya brotherhood. State-controlled 
media is used for its promotional purposes, including 
15 Fatima Ghoulaichi, “Of Saints and Sharifian Kings in Morocco: Three examples of the politics of reimagining history through reinventing king/saint 
relationship,” PhD thesis, University of Maryland, 2005.
16 Cédric Baylocq and Aziz Hlaoua, “Diffuser un «islam du juste milieu»?,” Afrique contemporaine 257, no. 1 (2016), pp. 113–28 <https://doi.org/10.3917/
afco.257.0113> (accessed May 17, 2019).
17 Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious development in Morocco and Indonesia (Chicago, 1971).
18 Žilvinas Švedkauskas, “Facilitating Political Stability: Cohabitation of non-legalistic Islam and the Moroccan monarchy,” Studia Orientalia Electronica 5 
(2017), pp. 1–26 <https://doi.org/10.23993/store.55591> (accessed May 17, 2019).
19 Isabelle Werenfels, “Beyond authoritarian upgrading: the re-emergence of Sufi orders in Maghrebi politics,” The Journal of North African Studies 19, no. 
3 (2014), pp. 275–95 <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2013.858036> (accessed May 17, 2019).
coverage of the Budshishiyya’s special gatherings and 
daily activities. Co-optation of individual budshishis 
is particularly apparent with the royal appointments 
of Ahmed Toufiq and Ahmad Qustas, prominent 
members of the brotherhood, to serve as the Min-
ister and the Chancellor at the Ministry of Religious 
Property and Islamic Affairs respectively.
In return, through this support, the monarchy has 
secured a solid partnership with an organization that 
has significant capacities to mobilize its mass fol-
lowing. A vivid example of this came in 2011, when 
members of the Budshishiyya, together with other 
pro-palace civil society organizations, participated 
in an ambiguous march in Casablanca in support of 
the new constitution proposed by the King, aiming 
to defuse popular contention of the Arab Spring. The 
mobilization of thousands of budschishis was essen-
tially directed against the 20 February Movement, a 
loose coalition of moderate and opposition Salafists 
and Secularists, protesting and demanding compre-
hensive social and political reforms in the Kingdom. 
Thus, at the domestic level, the Budshishiyya came 
to be seen as the “brotherhood of the palace.”19 Yet 
the Moroccan “shift to Africa” relies on networks of 
another Sufi order – the Tijaniyya, an organization 
with traditional links to West Africa, facilitating the 
Moroccan expansion southwards.
Building Institutions for Religious Diplomacy
The Moroccan economic and political turn to Africa 
follows in the footsteps of its religious diplomacy. 
Faced with similar terrorist threats emanating 
from organizations such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Din, Boko Haram, and their 
off-shoots, over recent years Sub-Saharan African 
countries have sought Moroccan expertise in reli-
gious governance and moderation, for instance, 
in the Northern Mali conflict. Trust in Moroccan 
regional religious authority has long roots, dating 
back to the precolonial Islamization of West Africa 
carried out by the Almoravids, a Berber dynasty of 
Morocco.
The Tijaniyya has been instrumental in nurturing 
these religious bonds until today. The brotherhood 
Sufi orders may act as a 
sort of an institutional 
substitute
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was founded by an Algerian Sufi exile Ahmad al-Tijani, 
who died in Fez in 1815. His following soon spread to 
Sub-Saharan Africa and turned al-Tijani’s mausoleum 
into a destination of religious pilgrimage for devo-
tees from West and Central Africa. Today, there are 
millions of tijani Muslims in countries such as Chad, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Maurita-
nia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, and others, who 
look up to Morocco and its royal dynasty for religious 
guidance.
Under Hassan II, Morocco had already instrumental-
ized tijani networks as a lever in regional disputes. 
For example, after the Organization of African Union 
(OAU) voted in favor of admitting Western Sahara 
into its ranks, the Moroccan Ministry of Endowments 
and Islamic Affairs organized a massive conference of 
the Tijaniyya in Fez to drum up support for its oppo-
sition to Algerian-backed Sahrawi independence 
claims.20 Two associations, the League of Scholars of 
Morocco and Senegal and the Association of Ulama 
of Morocco and Nigeria, were created following the 
conference, and served for the appropriation of tijani 
religious networks in furthering Moroccan foreign 
policy interests.21
With Africa as his foreign policy priority, Moham-
med VI has continued to intervene in the governance 
of transnational tijani networks. He has not only 
appointed personal representatives to the brother-
hood, but also determined that Mohammed al-Kabir 
al-Tijani take the position of the sheik at the Moroc-
can branch of the Tijaniyya, and regularly sends let-
ters and royal delegations to major tijani gatherings 
in Morocco and abroad.22 Over recent years, Moroc-
can religious foreign policy has become much more 
comprehensive.23 Starting with an agreement signed 
in September 2013 with Mali’s government to train 
500 Malian imams in an effort to promote a more tol-
erant version of Islam, Morocco has accepted similar 
requests from other West and Central African coun-
tries, announced plans to build a number of mosques 
and rehabilitate religious schools in the region, and 
20 Ann Marie Wainscott, “Religious Regulation as Foreign Policy: Morocco’s Islamic Diplomacy in West Africa,” Politics and Religion 11, no. 1 (2018), pp. 
1–26 <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048317000591> (accessed May 17, 2019).
21 Bakary Sambe, “Tidjaniya usages diplomatiques d’une confrérie soufie,” Politique étrangère Hiver, no. 4 (2010), pp. 843–54 <https://www.cairn.info/
load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=PE_104_084> (accessed May 17, 2019).
22 Salim Hmimnat, “‘Spiritual security’ as a (meta-)political strategy to compete over regional leadership: formation of Morocco’s transnational religious 
policy towards Africa,” The Journal of North African Studies 3, no. 68 (2018), pp. 1–39.
23 Ghita Tadlaoui, “Morocco’s religious diplomacy in Africa,” FRIDE policy brief 196 (2015).
24 Maghreb Arabe Presse, “HM the King Inaugurates Extension Project of Mohammed VI Institute for Imams Training,” press release, October 20, 2017 
<http://www.maroc.ma/en/royal-activities/hm-king-inaugurates-extension-project-mohammed-vi-institute-imams-training> (accessed May 17, 2019).
25 Hmimnat, “Spiritual Security.”
26 Maghreb Arabe Presse, “Nigerian President Visits Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams, Morchidines and Morchidates,” press release, June 
11, 2018 <http://www.maroc.ma/en/news/nigerian-president-visits-mohammed-vi-institute-training-imams-morchidines-and-morchidates> (accessed 
May 17, 2019).
27 “Fondation Mohammed VI des ouléma africains,” Le Matin, June 14, 2016 <https://lematin.ma/journal/2016/liste-des-membres-du-conseil-superieur-
de-la-fondation--mohammed-vi-des-oulema-africains/249161.html> (accessed May 17, 2019).
offered to provide copies of Koran with moderate 
exegesis by Moroccan religious scholars.
Two flagship institutions stand out in this regard. 
In March 2015, Mohammed VI inaugurated the 
Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams, 
Mourchidin and Mourchidat (male and female spiri-
tual guides). The majority of students at the institute 
come from Mali, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, and Tunisia. 
Smaller groups of students come from France, Nige-
ria, Chad, and Morocco itself.24 The institute has 
already been extended three times and offers both 
short and long-term programs with a capacity to 
accommodate around 800 students, the majority of 
whom, as a result of selection procedures that favor 
applicants with Sufi over other Islamic backgrounds, 
have connections to the Tijaniyya.25 The institute also 
serves as a destination for foreign delegations. For 
example, in June 2018, Nigerian president Muhamadu 
Buhari paid a visit to the institute highlighting reli-
gious assistance received from the Moroccan mon-
archy.26 The visit was later completed by the signing 
of strategic bilateral cooperation agreements, includ-
ing one on a landmark Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline 
project.
In July 2015, the Mohammed VI Foundation of Afri-
can Ulama was launched. Building on the legacy of 
League of Scholars of Morocco and Senegal, the 
Association of Ulama of Morocco and Nigeria, and the 
Mohammedan League of Ulama (founded in 2006), it 
serves to host conferences, publish studies and legal 
rulings, and advise governments. The Foundation’s 
High Council is based in Fez and includes around 120 
scholars from thirty countries all across Africa, with 
many of its members having tijani or Sufi-connec-
tions.27 With King Mohammed VI serving as the chair-
man and Ahmed Toufiq as its deputy chairman, the 
Foundation symbolizes the ambition to enlarge the 
space of the Moroccan monarch’s religious author-
ity and further instrumentalize Sufi networks to this 
purpose.
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Recommendations
The European Union and its member states should 
not passively observe how the Moroccan monarchy 
works its way south, but seek to apply a smart strat-
egy and effectively steer the transposition of Moroc-
can “soft” security in other African countries. At the 
same time, appropriate safeguards against authori-
tarian exploitation have to be set in place.
 - At high-level political fora, Europeans should 
acknowledge the merits of Moroccan regional 
efforts to counter the influence of radical Islamist 
ideologies, at the same time as pinpointing its 
inherent risks
The outlook of employing Moroccan religious “soft” 
power and infrastructure for fighting jihadi ideolo-
gies on a global stage should further be explored in 
dialogue between Morocco and the EU. Simultane-
ously, the EU and its member states ought to use 
the existing dialogue platforms to encourage a more 
inclusive Moroccan foreign policy towards Sub-Saha-
ran Africa, one that would not only benefit a closed 
circle of  palace-connected economic and political 
interests, but address wider segments of society both 
in Morocco and its target countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.
 - At the program level, Europeans should support 
more inclusive “soft” security cooperation between 
Morocco and Sub-Saharan African countries
The EU should refocus its assistance for APSA to 
encourage development of more comprehensive 
“soft” security cooperation and capacity-building 
programs based on inter-African exchange. In doing 
so, Europeans would avoid being perceived as intru-
sive and encourage local ownership of African secu-
rity policies.
Within the updated APSA support framework, 
allowances for the extension of programs at the 
Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams, 
Mourchidin and Mourchidat, and the Mohammed VI 
Foundation of African Ulama would create a double 
window of opportunity. On the one hand, engaging 
these institutions would acknowledge the impor-
tance of the work already carried out with royal 
patronage, and create incentives for more compre-
hensive cooperation. On the other hand, allocated 
European resources would enable the EU to call for 
the inclusion of a broader list of stakeholders (Salaf-
ists, both in Morocco and the Sub-Saharan Africa, 
diaspora networks, groups marginalized by selec-
tive royal patronage policies, and so on), make “soft” 
security cooperation less susceptible to authoritarian 
manipulation and more integral in the eyes of popu-
lations in receiving African countries, and thus more 
effective, overall.
 - Transposing the Moroccan “soft” security approach 
should be simultaneously programmed at EU-Mo-
roccan and EU-African cooperation levels
The institutional context is ripe for the EU to seize 
the moment and act upon the recommendations 
above. In November 2018, the EU-Morocco Associ-
ation Council decided to extend the EU-Morocco 
Action Plan (2013-2017) by one year. This means that 
a new five-year action plan, providing a road map 
for the development of EU-Morocco association, 
should be drafted in the near future. Moreover, the 
European Neighbourhood Instrument reaches the 
end of its current period in 2020. At the same time, 
revision to the expiring Cotonou agreement – which 
governs Africa-EU relations in the fields of develop-
ment cooperation, peace and security, and economic 
investment – is currently under way. Therefore, the 
timing is appropriate to seek synergies between dif-
ferent levels of EU foreign policy, and to use Euro-
pean levers for effectively streamlining Moroccan 
“soft” security in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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RETHINKING THE ECONOMICS OF 
MOROCCO’S REGIONAL POLICY
Abdelouahed Eloufir
Over the past years, Morocco has adopted an increas-
ingly voluntarist regional policy towards its southern 
partners, epitomizing a historical shift from decades 
of immobilism on the African continent. The country’s 
historical come-back to the African Union in 2017, 
after decades of absence, is a formal concretization 
of the monarchy’s increased efforts to enhance coop-
eration with Sub-Saharan African countries. Rabat’s 
new regional policy is motivated by several interre-
lated objectives, of which three stand out: becoming an 
economic regional hub, reducing its over-reliance on 
traditional European partners and, over the long run, 
establishing a de jure sovereignty over the disputed 
Western Sahara territory. Fostering available forms 
of cooperation with Algeria should be a short-term 
priority, with the European Union (EU), the African 
Union (AU), and their member countries promoting 
the gradual resolution of contentious issues between 
North African neighbors. Rabat’s foreign policy further 
needs to level governance structures and promote the 
participation of private sector actors. Producing such 
attitudinal changes would help all parties exit previous 
zero-sum game paradigms and avoid falling into new 
ones.
Rabat’s increasingly flexible stance as well as the 
political will shown by its leadership allow for cau-
tious optimism regarding its regional policy. How-
ever, while the Kingdom’s ambitions imply real and 
significant opportunities for mutually beneficial 
partnerships, several obstacles lie ahead. In particu-
lar, long-lasting disagreements with Algeria and con-
cerns expressed by representatives of the Sub-Sa-
haran African (SSA) private sector are hindering the 
attainment of Rabat’s foreign policy objectives.
Morocco’s shift southward was in great part gener-
ated by the overlap of the European economic and 
sovereign debt crises and the 2011 Arab uprisings. 
The two events had substantial negative spillovers on 
the Moroccan economy and were key factors leading 
to the rethinking of both domestic and foreign eco-
nomic policies of the Kingdom. For a country with a 
relatively limited market size and productivity levels 
such as Morocco, fostering economic growth means 
28 Dani Rodrik, “The Future of Economic Convergence,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 17400, August 2011 <https://www.nber.
org/papers/w17400> (accessed July 4, 2019).
29 Edward Leamer and James Levinsohn, “International Trade Theory: The Evidence,” NBER Working paper No. 4940, 1994 <https://www.nber.org/papers/
w4940> (accessed July 4, 2019).
greater regional integration as well as trade and 
investment diversification.28
At present, Morocco’s trade patterns run counter to 
the gravity model of international trade, which  posits 
that international trade patterns can be estimated 
according to the economic dimensions and distance 
between two countries.29 In effect, the Kingdom cur-
rently trades more with the European Union than it 
does with the Maghreb and SSA combined (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Morocco selected trade part-












Source: UN COMTRADE, 2017, data accessed through the World Bank’s World Integrated 
Trade Solution portal <https://wits.worldbank.org> (accessed July 4, 2019).
This is even true for trade ties between the Kingdom 
and a significantly less populated, distant European 
country such as the Netherlands, compared to trade 
with bordering countries, Algeria and Mauritania. 
While the lack of infrastructure and ethnolinguistic 
distance can partly explain such an anomaly for SSA 
countries, in the case of Algeria, political factors pre-
vail. Subsequently, it is incumbent upon policymakers 
to move away from this economically underperform-
ing status quo.
Sluggish Maghreb Union: Unbearable Costs
The Western Sahara question can be singled out as 
decisive in Morocco’s new regional policy. In effect, it 
remains one of the most divisive questions between 
Rabat and Algiers: the former claims sovereignty 
over the disputed territories while the latter backs 
the independence movement led by the Polisario 
front. Among the few attempts to estimate public 
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expenditures in Western Sahara, Abdelmoumni has 
established that USD 3.27 billion was spent on devel-
oping basic infrastructure and investment projects 
in the region between 1988 and 2007.30 In 2015, King 
Mohammed VI announced the launch of the new 
development plan for the region with a budget of 
USD 8 billion – 7.3 percent of the country’s GDP. In 
that context, regardless of normative and historical 
factors, any solution that rules out the Kingdom’s 
legal sovereignty over these territories will most 
likely be rejected by Morocco’s political leadership.
In turn, this issue has contributed to the death of the 
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), rendering much-needed 
economic integration with Algeria improbable in the 
short-term future. While the AMU generated high 
hopes after its creation in 1989, following the 1994 
Marrakesh terrorist attack, Morocco decided that 
Algerian citizens would require visas to enter the 
Kingdom, which led to the eventual closing of land 
borders between the two countries. Nevertheless, 
the very fact that these borders were open before-
hand demonstrates that cooperation is possible out-
side the definitive resolution of the Western Sahara 
question. In effect, discussions between Rabat and 
Algiers remain deadlocked because of a broader det-
rimental zero-sum game paradigm31 which divides 
political regimes rather than societies.
According to the World Bank, deeper integration 
between Maghreb countries would have increased 
Algeria’s and Morocco’s GDP per capita by 34 percent 
and 27 percent respectively between 2005 and 2015,32 
30 Fouad Abdelmoumni, “Western Sahara: The Cost of the Conflict,” Crisis Group report, June 11, 2007 <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-
africa/north-africa/western-sahara/western-sahara-cost-conflict> (accessed July 4, 2019).
31 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York, 1984).
32 “Economic Integration in the Maghreb,” World Bank report, October 1, 2010 <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/969341468278074872/p 
df/575190WP0Box353768B01PUBLIC10Maghrebpub.pdf> (accessed July 4, 2019).
33 Jean-Pierre Filiu and Stéphane Lacroix, Revisiting the Arab Uprisings: The Politics of a Revolutionary Moment (Oxford, 2018).
34 Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (Oxford, 1950).
35 Moubarack Lo, “Relations Maroc-Afrique subsaharienne : quel bilan pour les 15 dernières années?”, OCP Policy Center, Research Paper, November 2016 
<http://www.ocppc.ma/sites/default/files/OCPPC-RP1610v2.pdf> (accessed July 4, 2019).
allowing both countries to reach the World Bank’s 
upper-middle income threshold, a decisive step 
towards economic emergence. These projections are 
inherently linked to the two countries’ cultural, eth-
nolinguistic, and geographic proximity which, in the 
framework of deeper cooperation, would certainly 
generate sizable production flows. Amid increased 
socio-economic pressures and in the revolutionary 
moment the region finds itself in,33 economic coop-
eration seems inescapable. In effect, youth unem-
ployment remains above 20 percent and average 
annual growth rates amounted to only 3.5 percent 
over the past ten years in Maghreb countries (exclud-
ing Libya). Further, the aforementioned projections 
are perfectly in line with the theoretical literature: 
economists such as Jacob Viner pointed out the ben-
efits of integration for economic welfare as early as 
1950.34 Finally, increased integration would enhance 
development both quantitatively and qualitatively, 
with greater integration in global value chains con-
tributing to inclusive, job-creating, and productivi-
ty-enhancing growth.
Despite these well-documented and established 
opportunity costs, Algerian and Moroccan policy-
makers continue to perceive any economic success 
of their neighbor as detrimental to their own inter-
est. Within this framework, Morocco’s recent shift 
towards its southern neighbors is often depicted 
as an alternative to the AMU. According to a former 
Moroccan finance minister, it was in fact a move 
taken “out of desperation” regarding the impossible 
integration with Algeria that Rabat opted for this new 
strategy.
The Reality of Morocco’s Engagement in Sub-Saha-
ran Africa
In effect, the unfolding of an increasingly active eco-
nomic, political, and cultural diplomacy towards SSA 
countries underscores Morocco’s continuous efforts 
over the past decade to strengthen ties with its 
Southern partners. According to the OCP Policy Cen-
ter,35 between 2008 and 2013, 66 percent of Moroc-
can foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows went to 
Sub-Saharan Africa. According to the African Devel-
Morocco’s integration 
into ECOWAS concerns 
West African business 
 communities  
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Disagreements with 
 Algeria hinder Rabat’s 
 foreign  policy aims
opment Bank (ADB), this figure was up to 85 percent 
in 2016.36 In the political arena, the most apparent 
achievement was Rabat’s official return to the Afri-
can Union (AU) in 2017 after 33 years of absence. This 
marks the swiftest break from the past, overturning 
an ultimatum strategy that Morocco had realized 
was detrimental to its interests. In effect, it reflects 
an increasingly flexible stance, with Rabat accepting 
participation in an organization whose constitutive 
act was signed by the president of the Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic Republic (SADR), mentioned in the AU 
charter as a Head of State. This new strategy was in 
fact outlined by King Mohammed VI himself in a royal 
address to the AU in July 2016, stating that “when a 
body is sick, it is treated more effectively from the 
inside than from the outside.”
Morocco has also engaged in religious diplomacy 
through the construction of mosques and the train-
ing of imams, thereby adding a “soft power” layer to 
its foreign policy shift southward, strengthening the 
cultural bonds it shares with SSA countries.37 First, 
King Mohammed VI has made over 51 visits to SSA 
states, culminating in the signature of almost one 
thousand bilateral agreements related to educa-
tion, agriculture, development, and religious affairs. 
Furthermore, the Kingdom has relied heavily on the 
Tijaniyya Sufi brotherhoods, which have millions 
of followers across West African countries, many 
of which visit Ahmad al-Tijani’s mausolea in Fes. In 
recent years, the monarchy has engaged in a more 
aggressive strategy, appointing personal represen-
tatives to the Tijaniyya brotherhood and strength-
ening ties with West African representatives of the 
religious network. Finally, since its inception in 2015, 
the Mohammed VI Institute for the training of imams 
has welcomed students from a number of SSA coun-
tries and was even visited by Nigerian president 
Muhamadu Buhari in June 2018.
However, despite these efforts, Morocco has failed 
to join the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) more than two years after bene-
fiting from a political agreement in principle. More-
over, and in spite of these aforementioned issues, it 
is notable that Morocco currently trades more with 
Algeria than with Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria com-
36 “85% of Morocco’s Foreign Direct Investments is in Africa = AfDB,” AllAfrica, July 22, 2016 <http://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00044894.
html> (accessed July 4, 2019).
37 Ann Marie Wainscott, Religious Regulation as Foreign Policy: Morocco’s Islamic Diplomacy in West Africa (Cambridge, 2017).
38 Riccardo Fabiani, Morocco’s Difficult Path to ECOWAS Membership, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 28, 2018 <https://
carnegieendowment.org/sada/75926> (accessed July 4, 2019).
39 Richard Grabowski, “Deindustrialization in Africa,” International Journal of African Development 1 (2015).
bined (see Figure 2), illustrating the limits of political 
voluntarism.38
Figure 2: Morocco selected trade part-






































Source: UN COMTRADE data accessed through the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade 
Solution portal <https://wits.worldbank.org> (accessed July 4, 2019).
It was West African private sector representatives 
who first voiced clear opposition to the Kingdom’s 
inclusion in the trading bloc. In Nigeria and Senegal, 
both of which are already suffering from deindus-
trialization,39 business communities and unions are 
claiming that Morocco’s integration would further 
threaten some of their industries and manufacturing 
bases, mainly due to the trade agreement the King-
dom has with the EU.
Second, the benefits of Morocco’s Sub-Saharan 
African policy on its national economy are unclear. 
While Moroccan investments in SSA have been on 
the rise since the early 2000s, these remain limited 
to companies that benefit from the support of polit-
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ically powerful actors, such as OCP, Managem, Atti-
jariwafa Bank, BMCE Bank, Maroc Télécom, and the 
ONEE.40 Crucially, most of these companies operate 
in the financial and commodity extraction sectors, 
limiting the prospects for sizable job and trade cre-
ation between Morocco and its southern partners. 
 Moubarack Lo’s OCP-sponsored econometric analy-
sis has estimated that a 1 percent increase in Moroc-
can FDIs towards Sub-Saharan Africa has led to a 0.01 
percent increase in the Kingdom’s GDP per capita.41 
Regardless of the magnitude, it remains unclear what 
impact investment had in terms of jobs and trade 
creation, and which segments of the population ben-
efitted from capital inflows.
Third, a top-down integration process can lead to 
potential drawbacks that could seriously dampen 
cooperation in the long run. Notwithstanding these 
precautionary remarks, it should be emphasized 
that greater cooperation between Morocco and SSA 
countries can be economically pertinent and mutu-
ally beneficial over the long-run. A tailored integra-
tion into ECOWAS can help the Kingdom achieve 
its objective of becoming a trade and production 
hub between the European, African, and American 
trading blocs. Part of this strategy consists of favor-
ing the internationalization of Moroccan companies 
which can hardly compete with European firms and 
are therefore pursuing economies of scale in SSA. In 
turn, SSA economies would benefit from knowledge 
transfers and improved access to European markets.
Recommendations
 - Moroccan and Sub-Saharan African political lead-
erships should better integrate their respective pri-
vate sectors and workers’ representatives in negoti-
ations, privileging long-term over short-term gains
While Morocco’s internationalization strategy has the 
potential to be economically pertinent, Rabat should 
acknowledge that it can threaten SSA’s nascent 
industries. While political discussions between 
the Moroccan and West African heads of states in 
the framework of the Kingdom’s admission to the 
ECOWAS are very advanced, West African interest 
groups have voiced significant opposition to this 
integration. The significant gap between govern-
ments and private sector representatives needs to be 
reduced. Governance should therefore be made more 
horizontal and involve all stakeholders affected by 
40 Louis Delatronchette, “Cartographie de la présence des grandes entreprises marocaines en Afrique,” Telquel, May 11, 2017 <https://telquel.
ma/2017/05/11/cartographie-de-la-presence-des-grandes-entreprises-marocaines-en-afrique_1545709> (accessed July 4, 2019).
41 See footnote 35.
Morocco’s regional economic policy. While enlarging 
the negotiation will likely lengthen the integration 
process, it is necessary to establish much-needed 
trust, transparency, and accountability. Moroccan 
and West African public and private sectors would 
thereby secure sound, long-term cooperation, which 
surely has the potential to be mutually beneficial.
 - European and Sub-Saharan decision-makers 
should acknowledge the game-changing potential of 
economic integration between Morocco and Algeria 
and make greater use of diplomacy to foster coop-
eration
Depending on the degree of such integration, poten-
tial positive economic spillovers include increased 
investment opportunities and market access for 
European and African firms, enhanced productivity, 
industrialization, job creation, and in the longer term, 
lower migration flows. European and African diplo-
matic corps should encourage Algeria and Morocco 
to attend multilateral meetings and conferences to 
mediate between the two North African neighbors, 
whose non-cooperation impacts negatively on the 
whole Mediterranean region. The outcome of the 
ongoing power restructuring process in Algeria 
remains unclear and is a primarily national matter. 
The aforementioned stakeholders should however, 
be proactive in seizing windows of opportunity and 
promoting the reactivation of the AMU.
 - North African, Sub-Saharan African, and European 
policymakers, and their private sector represen-
tatives should put greater emphasis on fostering 
cooperation between Morocco and Algeria
Such a step is certainly not mutually exclusive with 
Morocco’s economically relevant, pro-active policy 
towards its southern neighbors. Nonetheless, even 
if successful, the latter will most likely be a complex 
and lengthy process. Further, due to these countries’ 
ethnolinguistic and economic development profiles, 
according to leading international financial institu-
tions, trade integration with Maghreb countries is 
more likely to generate job and growth creation over 
a relatively short timeframe.
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 - Morocco and Algeria should establish formal mech-
anisms to discuss contentious issues and prioritize 
private sector-led initiatives
Given the complexity of the two states’ long-standing 
dispute, political will and courage from all involved 
parties will be required to solve this issue. Achiev-
able, private sector-oriented development projects 
should be established in the infrastructure sector, 
such as the trans-Maghreb railway presented last 
March by the secretary general of the Arab Maghreb 
Union. The support of several international financial 
institutions, including the African Development Bank, 
demonstrates that such projects are economically 
sound, bankable, and achievable should sufficient 
political will be shown.
Abdelouahed Eloufir is a graduate student of 
international economic policy at the School of 
International Affairs at Sciences Po, Paris and 
currently holds an analyst position at a sovereign 
advisory firm in Paris.
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MOROCCO’S SOUTH-SOUTH 
COOPERATION STRATEGIES – AN 
ADVANTAGE FOR EXISTING NORTH-
SOUTH PARTNERSHIPS
Ingrid Heidlmayr-Chegdaly
The economic and financial crisis of 2008 has shown 
that unexpected changes in economic development 
also affect partner countries, which were not directly 
touched by the crisis. If economic and political coop-
eration and partnerships are exhausted, or if the 
economic and political gains of external coopera-
tion become less attractive for partner countries, the 
search for alternative cooperation partners and forms 
becomes inevitable. The loss of economic gains and 
advantages in existing EU-Moroccan partnerships has 
urged Morocco to find new trading opportunities, espe-
cially on the African continent. However, European 
policymakers should consider Morocco’s accession 
to the African Union (AU) and its application for full 
membership of the Economic Community of West Afri-
can States (ECOWAS) as an opportunity to strengthen 
Europe’s Africa policy. Europe must thus be aware of 
Morocco’s external policy shift towards Africa and 
find ways to tackle the trilateral cooperation between 
Africa, Morocco, and Europe in the future. Considering 
Morocco as a regional hub and entrance to the African 
market, the EU should use Morocco’s leverage and geo-
graphic position as a mediation tool for its own Africa 
policy. Stronger cooperation between Morocco and the 
EU beyond existing economic and political frameworks 
would enable the EU to access the African market more 
easily.
In recent years, Morocco has progressively improved 
relations with the EU, primarily through the Associ-
ation Agreement, the negotiations on the Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), and 
the statut avancé.42 As Morocco cannot apply for EU 
membership, the EU cannot offer closer institutional, 
political, and economic cooperation beyond already 
existing forms of partnership. In particular, the offer 
42 Morocco was granted the statut avancé (advanced status) by the EU in 2008 to continue and deepen relations within the framework of the Association 
Agreement signed in 1996.
43 Romano Prodi, “A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the key to stability,” speech given in December 2002 at the Peace, Security And Stability 
International Dialogue and the Role of the EU conference in Brussels <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-02-619_en.htm> (accessed May 10, 
2019).
44 European Commission, “European Union, Trade in goods with Morocco,” <https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/details_
morocco_en.pdf> (accessed May 10, 2019).
45 S. El Khayat, “Les enjeux de la politique africaine du Maroc,” Revue Espace Géographie et Société Marocaine (No. 5, 2015), pp. 66, 70.
46 “Maroc-Afrique : Hausse moyenne de 5% des échanges commerciaux en 10 ans,” November 8, 2019 <https://lnt.ma/maroc-afrique-hausse-moyenne-
de-5-echanges-commerciaux-10-ans/> (accessed May 10, 2018).
47 Ghita Tadlaoui, “Morocco’s Religious Diplomacy in Africa – Analysis,” Eurasia Review, March 1, 2015 <https://www.eurasiareview.com/01032015-
moroccos-religious-diplomacy-in-africa-analysis/> (accessed May 10, 2019).
48 Tamba François Koundouno, “‘Morocco-China Silk Road Council’ to Boost Sino-Moroccan Relations,” Morocco World News, March 29, 2018 <https://
www.moroccoworldnews.com/2018/03/243348/morocco-china-silk-road-council-boost-sino-moroccan-relations/> (accessed May 10, 2019).
to share everything but institutions43 sets clear limits 
on integration possibilities for neighboring countries. 
In 2009, the annual import and export rates between 
Morocco and the EU partners declined. Even though 
the commercial trade between the EU and Morocco 
resumed growth in 2010, the economic crisis in 2008 
proved how economic shifts in Europe affect eco-
nomic partner countries.44 Despite Morocco’s good 
relations with Europe, the country strengthened 
economic and political ties with countries of differ-
ent regions in the world, particularly the Gulf states, 
Turkey, the United States, and Asia. However, the 
perspectives of these relations rarely go beyond the 
frameworks of economic free-trade agreements.
Due to its emerging markets, population growth, 
growing middle class, and existing natural resources, 
the African continent provides various opportuni-
ties for investment and development.45 Over the past 
decade, Morocco has tried to diversify its tradition-
ally northern-oriented foreign relations southwards. 
Between 2007 and 2017, Morocco could increase its 
commercial trade with the African continent by a 
yearly average of five percent.46 By developing closer 
economic and political relations with Sub-Saha-
ran African countries, Morocco intends to improve 
its regional image and boost exports. In particular, 
King Mohammed VI’s official visits and the signing 
of numerous cooperation agreements with African 
countries demonstrate a profound shift in Morocco’s 
foreign relations with Africa.47
The search for new institutional, political, and eco-
nomic cooperation thus became inevitable for 
Morocco. Under the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, 
Morocco signed a bilateral agreement with China 
in November 2017 to expand and foster commercial 
exchanges. Additionally, a Morocco-China business 
council was established to promote China’s gigan-
tic Silk Road project.48 In January 2017, Morocco was 
admitted to the African Union (AU), and in February 
the same year, it submitted its application for full 
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membership of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS). Even though ECOWAS 
members have agreed “in principle” to Morocco’s 
accession, West African businesses fear Moroccan 
competitors would crush them. In Nigeria, ECOWAS’s 
largest economy, criticism of Morocco’s membership 
bid is especially strong, as they fear Morocco would 
benefit from freer trade but not respect other rules, 
such as visa-free travel. Thus, Morocco’s membership 
demand seems at the moment to be on hold. In the 
long-term however, Morocco’s potential ECOWAS 
membership can potentially benefit Europe, espe-
cially European private sector investments.
Morocco’s African Foreign Policy
Morocco’s African foreign policy is neither a new nor 
a recent phenomenon, but differs on various points 
from its previous foreign policies. First, Morocco’s 
new African policy strongly focusses on the economic 
sector, particularly on investments and trade, such 
as banking, mining, telecommunications, and con-
struction. Second, this policy not only encompasses 
but goes beyond francophone partner countries, 
especially towards East African countries. Recently, 
cooperation agreements with Kenya, Ethiopia, Nige-
ria, and Zambia have been concluded. The third char-
acteristic is the dominant role of King Mohammed 
VI, who regularly visits African partner countries 
and generally holds high-level talks and inaugurates 
development projects.49 King Mohammed VI’s com-
mitment to the African continent was highlighted by 
his decision to establish a Ministry for African Affairs. 
The new Minister for African Cooperation, Mohcine 
Jazouli, was appointed in January 2018 with the mis-
sion to boost Morocco’s investment strategy on the 
African continent.50 In addition, Morocco intends 
to promote peace and counter extremism in the 
Sub-Saharan region through exporting its “spiritual 
security” experience.
However, the new Africa-oriented religious policy 
is not a new policy orientation, but an extension of 
earlier religious policies developed in the mid-1980s 
as a form of alternative or parallel diplomacy. The 
aim of Morocco’s transnational religious policy is 
to consolidate spiritual heritage and strategic part-
nerships with African countries and to protect the 
49 N. Messari, “Morocco’s African Foreign Policy,” Menara Papers Future Notes 5, Rome, 2018.
50 “Maroc : Rabat nomme son nouveau « Monsieur Afrique »,” La Tribune Afrique, January, 23, 2018 <https://afrique.latribune.fr/politique/integration-
regionale/2018-01-23/maroc-rabat-nomme-son-nouveau-monsieur-afrique-765752.html> (accessed January 2, 2019).
51 Salim Hmimnat, “Morocco’s Religious ‘Soft Power’ in Africa: As a strategy supporting Morocco’s stretching in Africa,” Moroccan Institute for Policy 
Analysis, June 6, 2018, pp. 6-7, 10-11 <http://mipa.institute/5642> (accessed May 10, 2019).
52 Vish Sakthivel, “Morocco’s New Africa Policy? The African Union, Algeria, and Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 
22, 2016 <https://www.fpri.org/2016/07/moroccos-new-africa-policy/> (accessed May 10, 2019).
country’s national security by countering terrorism 
and extremism all over the continent. Additionally, 
it is a transnational instrument to join the African 
community by surpassing the division between Alge-
ria and Morocco.51 Politically, it is easier for Morocco 
to strengthen partnerships across the Sahara than 
in its own neighborhood, as regional economic and 
political integration in the Maghreb still suffers from 
a long-running rivalry with Algeria.
Morocco’s turn towards stronger south-south coop-
eration is a response to its exhausted northern coop-
eration partnerships, which do not offer cooperation 
possibilities beyond those that already exist. This 
rapprochement coincides with a difficult period of 
EU-Moroccan relations, especially regarding goods 
originating from the disputed southern provinces. 
Even though Morocco expected more pro-Moroccan 
reactions from the EU, its re-integration to the AU 
and ECOWAS membership bid should certainly not 
be considered as Morocco turning away from the EU. 
The country certainly aims to rely on good relations 
with its partner countries across the Mediterranean. 
However, Morocco also uses the opportunity to 
engage with every possible ally.52
The Hub Between Europe and Africa
Morocco’s existing strong relations with Europe 
(especially the statut avancé and DCFTA negotiations) 
as well as the country’s foreign policy orientation 
towards African countries strengthen its position as 
a mediator between Europe and Africa on the insti-
tutional and political level. Aware of its role as a hub 
and link between Europe and Africa, Morocco skill-
fully uses its leverage for strengthening its economic 
and political ties with European and African coun-
Morocco’s African foreign 
policy is neither a new nor 
a recenet phenomenon
Chapter II:  Morocco‘s  Regional Policy and  Implications for  EU-Morocco Relations
46
REPORT
No. 4 | January 2020 – first published in July 2019
tries. Security cooperation and migration are gaining 
increasing importance in the Europe-Morocco-Africa 
triangle. To date, Morocco already participates in 
trilateral cooperation between Africa-Morocco and 
Japan, France, and Belgium, namely in the areas of 
infrastructure, health care, development, and agri-
culture. Trilateral cooperation within the advanced 
status with the EU enables Morocco to provide its 
knowledge in the fields of renewable energy, tourism, 
local governance, and public housing.53
Since 2009, trade between Morocco and Sub-Saha-
ran Africa has increased annually by 12.8 percent. 
However, the share of Morocco’s external trade of 
Sub-Saharan African countries remains low in com-
parison to other partners, such as the EU or the 
MENA region. This might be due to the weakness of 
African capital markets’ infrastructure, the non-ap-
plication of trade protocols, and the absence of direct 
land or sea transport lines.54 Besides numerous bilat-
eral cooperation agreements with Sub-Saharan Afri-
can states, Morocco’s efforts to conclude multilateral 
agreements or to join supranational communities, 
such as the ECOWAS, confirms the country’s inten-
tion to foster a regionally oriented and far-reaching 
economic investment policy.
Morocco’s Multiple Identities
Morocco’s multiple identities enable the North Afri-
can country to position itself as a hub and interme-
diator. Lesson-drawing and experience-sharing with 
African, Arab, and European states enables Morocco 
to select best practices and benefit advantageously 
53 Royal Institute for Strategic Studies (IRES), “Les relations Maroc-Afrique: les voies d’une stratégie globale et rénovée. Rapport général de l’étude 
thématique” (Rabat, 2012), p. 21 <http://www.ires.ma/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/RAPPORT_AFRIQUE.pdf> (accessed February 12, 2019).
54 R. Berahab, “Relations between Morocco and Sub-Saharan Africa: What is the potential for trade and foreign direct investment?,” Policy Brief PB-17/04, 
OCP Policy Center, Rabat, 2017, p. 1.
55 IRES, “La Politique Africaine du Maroc,” October 26, 2015, p. 4.
56 Moussa Diop and Khalil Essalek, “Mohamed Methqal de l’AMCI: déjà 25.000 diplômés africains formés au Maroc,” Le360Afrique, October 1, 2017 
<http://afrique.le360.ma/maroc/politique/2017/10/01/15468-video-mohamed-methqal-de-lamci-deja-25000-diplomes-africains-formes-au-
maroc-15468> (accessed February 12, 2019).
57 Salim Hmimnat, “Training Malian Imams in Morocco: Challenges and Prospects,” Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis, March 21, 2019 <https://mipa.
institute/6639?fbclid=IwAR3N3XcyuNTXQY6jQl_k1CRs 8wExuyw1K_hWqdkZwKFMop9AylRccS2tsSs> (accessed March 23, 2019).
58 Tadlaoui, “Morocco’s Religious Diplomacy in Africa,” p. 2.
from each regions’ expertise and advantages. Moroc-
co’s geographic location and African identity enables 
the country to benefit from a comparative advantage 
on the regional and continent-wide level, because 
many African states consider Morocco as a role 
model for political and economic development. This 
is due, among other factors, to Morocco’s proactive 
soft diplomacy in higher education and socialization 
efforts of future African leaders.
Every year, around 16,000 African students from 47 
different countries study at Moroccan universities, 
with almost 6,500 receiving scholarships from the 
Moroccan Agency for International Cooperation 
(AMCI).55 Additionally, special leadership programs 
provide professional trainings for public sector offi-
cials. This training cooperation is based on strong 
institutional partnerships and ties.56 Besides the 
institutional and interpersonal relations between 
students and public officials with their host institu-
tions, these students become political and economic 
leaders once they return to their home countries. 
In their public positions, they will maintain good 
relations with Morocco and adopt pro-Moroccan 
approaches in their professional environment. 
Furthermore, Morocco’s religious identity is an 
important tool of its soft diplomacy. The Mohammed 
VI Institute, established in 2015, trains imams from 
Arab, African, and European countries with the goal 
of forming a religious elite. In addition to selection 
criteria favoring members of certain religious orders, 
access to the Mohamed VI Institute can also serve 
concrete political interests, either of the imams’ 
home countries or of Morocco, such as support for 
ruling power circles.57 
Moreover, Mohamed VI uses a moderate discourse of 
Islam to help build new economic and political ties. 
Besides the king’s status of “Commander of the Faith-
ful,” according to the Moroccan constitution, citizens 
in West African countries also consider him as a reli-
gious leader, especially members of the Tijaniyyah 
Brotherhood, a Sufi group within Sunni Islam.58 Addi-
tionally, Morocco is not only a recipient of interna-
Creating a Ministry for 
African Affairs reflects the 
king’s commitment
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tional development aid, but also provides large sums 
of development aid to Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries. Morocco cancelled debt for the least developed 
countries on the continent and granted trade pref-
erences, triangle cooperation, and development pro-
jects for African partner countries.59
Recommendations
European policymakers should thus consider Moroc-
co’s regional experiences and integrate the country’s 
sector-specific expertise and knowledge, especially 
in the fields of renewable energy, infrastructure, and 
administrative regionalization. Strengthening insti-
tutional ties with Moroccan public authorities and 
higher education institutions may further enable the 
EU to create strong partnerships with African part-
ner institutions.
 - The EU should strategically use Morocco’s lever-
age as a hub and intermediator between Africa, the 
MENA region, and Europe in its own Africa policy
Due to its multiple identities as well as its geo-
graphic location, Morocco has become an important 
hub and intermediator between the Euro-Mediter-
ranean region and Africa over the past few decades. 
Regarding its regional leverage as well as its exper-
tise in securitization, institutional development, and 
socioeconomic transformation, the EU should stra-
tegically benefit from Morocco’s regional advantage 
and important position as a global player for its own 
regional MENA and African policies. Close ties and 
linkages between European economic policymak-
ers and entrepreneurs will enable European private 
actors to invest more easily on the African continent.
 - European policymakers should show greater flexi-
bility in negotiations within the DCFTA and other 
trade and agricultural agreements
Morocco has a strong and competitive economy, 
a good investment infrastructure, and Moroccan 
companies and groups are represented in numer-
ous African countries. As the gateway to Africa, 
Europe should consider Morocco’s economic power 
in its own foreign trade relations. Morocco’s grow-
ing economy has enabled the country to search 
for new and alternative trading partners and allies 
beyond existing ones. A probable ECOWAS member-
ship would boost the country’s economy even fur-
ther, and constitutes a potential benefit for EU and 
59 IRES, “La Politique Africaine du Maroc,” p. 4.
European private actors. Thus, European leaders and 
policymakers should take the opportunity to engage 
more strongly with Morocco by offering advantages 
in existing and future trade agreements, in order to 
benefit from Morocco’s regional economic clout.
 - Europe should encourage Morocco’s soft diplomacy, 
security, and development strategy in Africa to 
combat global terrorism and poverty
Besides engaging in diverse development and secu-
rity programs, the EU should strengthen Moroc-
co’s efforts in its African security and development 
policy. Morocco transfers not only financial aid but 
also knowledge to African countries in the fields of 
production, administration, and security. Due to 
Morocco’s strong religious, cultural, and societal ties, 
cooperation in these fields will boost the impact of 
foreign securitization and development policies in 
the region. The exchange of experiences and best 
practices will also enable European actors to improve 
EU security and development strategies as well as 
their implementation. By supporting Morocco’s secu-
rity and development strategies in Africa, the EU can 
gain from Morocco’s experiences and knowledge to 
improve its own cooperation strategies.
 - Morocco should define more clearly the role of its 
economic and political institutions in its foreign 
policy strategies towards the EU and Africa
Aware of its own distinct path of democratic tran-
sition, Morocco should deploy its own economic 
institutions and political actors more precisely to 
better advance its agenda with the EU. While having 
a clear vision of projects and timelines within Moroc-
co’s Africa policy, the African agenda should however 
remain a distinct approach in Morocco’s foreign pol-
icy.
Ingrid Heidlmayr-Chegdaly is scientific coordina-
tor at the Hanns-Seidel-Foundation in Rabat and 
a member of the Innsbruck Center for European 
Research (ICER).
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MOROCCO’S MIGRATION POLICY 
AT STAKE – BETWEEN FOREIGN 
POLICY GAINS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
COSTS
Tachfine Baida
Morocco’s adoption of a new migration policy in the 
aftermath of the so-called Arab Spring has resulted in 
paradoxical outcomes. Whereas this strategy has suc-
ceeded in serving Morocco’s diplomatic interests in 
sub-Saharan Africa, particularly through bolstering 
its image as a regional power, its effectiveness in pro-
tecting migrants’ rights and promoting their integra-
tion at a domestic level has been limited. Furthermore, 
with the arrival of more migrants in the country and 
growing pressure to increase surveillance at its bor-
ders, Morocco has shown ambivalence in its treatment 
of migrants. If the Moroccan government wants to 
maintain its image as a regional “leader” on migration, 
considerable efforts to adjust policy need to be made. 
It is particularly recommended that Morocco: estab-
lishes a mechanism to prevent acts of violence against 
migrants, expedites the adoption of a migration and 
asylum law in line with international human rights 
standards, and allocates more funds to integration and 
protection programs.
Long disregarded by Moroccan policymakers, 
sub-Saharan Africa has been the focus of much atten-
tion in recent years. In the power vacuum created 
with the retreat of North African powers following 
the 2011 upheavals, Morocco saw an opportunity to 
be seized. The political instability of regional powers 
such as Libya and Egypt provided Morocco prospects 
for (re)claiming a key role in Africa. One of the main 
aspects of this foreign policy shift consisted of rep-
resenting the country as a safe haven for migrants. In 
2013, under the initiative of King Mohammed VI, the 
country adopted the National Strategy for Immigra-
tion and Asylum, (SNIA), with the aim of “ensuring a 
better integration of migrants and a better manage-
ment of migratory flows in the framework of a coher-
ent, global, humanist, and responsible policy.”60 Since 
the SNIA’s adoption, Morocco has sought to display 
the image of a host country that welcomes migrants. 
Breaking with the view of migration as a problem, 
official discourses represented it as an opportunity. 
In parallel, two campaigns to regularize migrants 
60 Royaume du Maroc, “Politique Nationale d’Immigration et d’Asile 2013-2016,” (2016).
61 Hassina Mechaï, “Maroc: au-delà du pacte de Marrakech, faire entendre sa voix en Afrique, Le Point Afrique, December 19, 2018 <http://afrique.lepoint.
fr/actualites/maroc-au-dela-du-pacte-de-marrakech-faire-entendre-la-voix-de-l-afrique-page-3-19-12-2018-2280798_2365.php> (accessed May 11, 
2019).
62 African Union, “For An African Agenda on Migration: Report of His Majesty King Mohammed VI, King of Morocco, Leader on Migration, to the 30th 
Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union,” January 2018.
were conducted in 2014 and 2017, which benefitted 
some 50,000 individuals, most of whom come from 
sub-Saharan African countries.61
Morocco’s adoption of the SNIA contributed substan-
tially to reinforcing the country’s diplomatic ties with 
African countries. King Mohammed VI’s appointment 
as the African Union “Champion” of Migration only 
one year after Morocco’s return to the pan-African 
organization became emblematic of the country’s 
new role as a regional model for migration manage-
ment in Africa. On the occasion of the 30th ordinary 
session of the Assembly of Heads of States and Gov-
ernments of the African Union (AU) in January 2018, 
the King submitted a report entitled “For an African 
Agenda on Migration.” The report boldly advocates an 
“Afro-centric and humanistic” approach to migration. 
It dismisses control of migratory flows as ineffective 
in addressing the root causes of migration and recog-
nizes migration as an opportunity for development.62 
In December 2018, Morocco was mandated by the AU 
to host an African Observatory on Migrations within 
its territory, the first institution of its kind on the 
continent.
The strategy of positioning Morocco as a regional 
model for managing migration in Africa also paid 
off at a global level. Indeed, the SNIA was effective 
in attracting the interest of Western donors to fund 
numerous programs and projects associated with 
migration. In the view of many donors, including the 
European Union (EU), the SNIA provided a framework 
to facilitate the integration of migrants in Morocco 
and prevent them from seeking further opportunities 
in Europe.
The Pitfalls of Morocco’s Migration Policy
Morocco’s decision to enact a new policy on migra-
tion management proved effective insofar as it 
enabled the country to strengthen its ties with Afri-
can countries as well as with the EU. Nevertheless, 
whereas the SNIA initially resulted in positive out-
comes for Morocco’s diplomacy, the country seems 
to be facing increasing difficulties with migration 
at the domestic level. At the same time as Moroc-
can officials continue to depict Morocco as a safe 
haven for migrants, migrants’ rights in Morocco 
have shown little improvement. Furthermore, recent 
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developments have shown the limits of the Moroccan 
approach to managing migration. Most importantly, 
the upsurge of acts of violence against migrants, the 
ongoing absence of a legal framework for asylum and 
migration, and the lack of prospects for migrants’ 
socioeconomic integration have threatened the sus-
tainability of the SNIA. In the long-run, this could 
result in damage to Morocco’s relations with both its 
African neighbors as well as with the EU.
Resurgence of Violence Against Migrants
Perhaps the best illustration of Morocco’s ambivalent 
approach to migration is the resurgence of violence 
against migrants in the country. In 2018, the Italian 
government’s decision to block migrants arriving by 
sea resulted in increased numbers of migrants cross-
ing the Mediterranean through Morocco and Spain. 
As a result, EU states started to pressure Morocco 
to increase border surveillance and stop illegal 
crossings. Although Rabat officially refused,63 state 
authorities conducted violent operations to disperse 
migrant populations in the country. In the summer of 
2018, hundreds of migrants were deported from the 
regions of Tangiers, Tetouan, and Nador to the south 
of the country.64 In the same period, migrant camps 
along the northern coast were destroyed and several 
migrants were expelled from the territory.65 These 
operations were conducted outside of any legal basis 
or procedure.
Acts of racism and discrimination against migrants 
also continue to plague the atmosphere in the coun-
try. As described in a report by the UN Special Rap-
porteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance, 
many migrants have reported experiencing acts of 
discrimination when seeking access to public ser-
vices, including healthcare, education, and employ-
ment.66 Several civil society organizations also report 
a rise of racism in the country, criticizing the fact that 
acts of discrimination committed against migrants of 
color often remain unpunished.
63 In a press conference held on 26 October 2018, Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita said that “Morocco has never been and never will be the police of 
anyone.” <https://lematin.ma/journal/2018/nasser-bourita-maroc-n-ete-n-sera-gendarme/303571.html> (accessed May 11, 2019).
64 GADEM, “Coûts et blessures : Rapport sur les opérations des forces de l’ordre menées dans le nord du Maroc entre juillet et septembre 2018” <https://
www.lacimade.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/20180927_GADEM_Couts_et_blessures.pdf> (accessed May 11, 2019).
65 GADEM, “Expulsions gratuites: Note d’analyse sur les mesures d’éloignement mises en œuvre hors de tout cadre légal entre septembre et octobre 
2018,” 2018.
66 Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, “Déclaration de fin de mission de la Rapporteuse spéciale sur les formes contemporaines de racisme, 
de discrimination raciale, de xénophobie et de l’intolérance qui y est associée à l’issue de sa mission au Royaume du Maroc,” December 21, 2018.
67 Royaume du Maroc, Loi n° 02-03 du 20 novembre 2003 relative à l’entrée et au séjour des étrangers au Royaume du Maroc, à l’émigration et 
l’immigration irrégulières. <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/SERIAL/83963/93068/F122010 3868/MAR-83963.pdf > (accessed May 11, 2019).
Lack of Long-Term Integration Prospects
Whereas the SNIA was supposed to set the stage for 
the establishment of a legal framework for migration 
in Morocco, the government has not yet introduced 
adequate reforms to ensure the proper integration 
of migrants in the country. Current legal provisions 
can be problematic. For example, Law 02-03 on the 
entry and residency of foreigners in the Kingdom of 
Morocco and on irregular emigration and immigra-
tion has not been amended since its adoption. This 
law, adopted in the aftermath of the 2003 terrorist 
attacks, has today become obsolete insofar as it can 
be used to legitimize the expulsion of migrants from 
the country. The law refers to “foreigners who con-
stitute a threat to public order” (Articles 4, 14, 16, 21, 
and 25), and allows authorities to expel them from 
Moroccan territory (Article 25). What a “threat to 
public order” means however is not defined, which 
can potentially result in abuses.67 In addition, Moroc-
can authorities are still unable to process asylum 
claims. The Office of Refugees and Stateless Persons 
(BRA) which opened in 2013, is not functional because 
there is no legal basis that allows it to process asy-
lum claims. In the absence of a working mechanism 
in Morocco, the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) is still taking responsibility for 
receiving and processing asylum claims, as well as 
providing relevant protection for refugees.
Five years after the adoption of the SNIA, migrants 
still face substantial difficulties settling in Morocco. 
In spite of state discourses, very few migrants, even 
those who have benefitted from the two regular-
ization campaigns, are able to make a decent living 
Despite Rabat’s  official 
refusal,  authorities  used 
violence against migrants
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in the country. While the government adopted sev-
eral decrees to allow migrants and Moroccans equal 
access to public services, national social services still 
lack the capacity to respond to vulnerable migrants’ 
needs. As a result, migrants often find it challenging 
to access basic services, including healthcare, emer-
gency housing, and employment services.68 Instead of 
investing more resources to provide these services to 
migrants, Morocco has been encouraging so-called 
voluntary return plans, which provide financial aid 
to migrants to return to their home countries. How-
ever, these strategies are controversial and do little 
to serve the objectives of the SNIA.
Making EU Border Security a Priority over 
Migrants’ Protection
Faced with what has been labelled as “Europe’s 
migrant crisis,” a number of foreign aid instruments 
have been developed by European states to address 
migration flows.69 Given its central position in migra-
tory movements, Morocco has, in the past few years, 
been one of the main recipients of this aid. One of 
the main instruments currently targeting Morocco is 
the European Union Trust Fund (EUTF). for address-
ing the root causes of irregular migration in Africa 
Established following the Valetta Summit in 2015, 
this multi-donor fund is meant to provide quick and 
effective funding for projects aimed at ensuring sta-
bility through better “management of migration.”70 
Nonetheless, while this fund was initially meant to 
address the actual causes of migration in close coop-
eration with recipient governments in Africa, much of 
this aid is being unilaterally diverted to border secu-
rity management. Indeed, with the growth of illegal 
crossings to Spain in 2018, the EU has been pushing 
for the reallocation of the EUTF to border manage-
68 Plateforme Nationale de Protection des Migrants, “Etat des lieux de l’accès aux services pour les personnes migrantes,” 2017.
69 Tubiana Jérôme et al., “Multilateral Damage: The impact of EU migration policies on central Saharan routes,” Clingendael, September 2018 <https://
www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-09/multilateral-damage.pdf> (accessed May 11, 2019).
70 “Plan D’Action” Valetta Summit on Migration, 2015 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21838/action-plan-fr-2.pdf> (accessed May 11, 2019).
71 European Commission, “EU Cooperation on Migration with Morocco,” December 2018 <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/
files/eu-morocco-factsheet.pdf> (accessed May 11, 2019).
72 Fouzi Mourji et al., Migrants subsahariens au Maroc : enjeux d’une migration de résidence,” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Rabat, 2016.
ment on the southern Mediterranean coastline. Since 
2018, the EU has adopted two major projects aimed at 
enhancing border authorities’ capacity to stop illegal 
crossings in the western Mediterranean, totaling of 
€95 million. At the same time, funds directed at pro-
tection programs have been steadily diminishing. As 
of December 2018, they represented a mere 10 per-
cent of European cooperation dedicated to migration 
in Morocco.71 With Moroccan authorities still unable 
to respond to basic migrants’ rights, there is serious 
cause to fear that numerous migrants in vulnerable 
conditions could suffer from the consequences of 
this trend.
Whereas border management might seem impera-
tive in the light of recent political developments in 
Europe, it does not address the root causes of migra-
tion and does not serve the purposes of the SNIA. 
Border management is unproductive and results in 
creating a security focus unconducive to integration. 
The management of foreign aid dedicated to migra-
tion seems to be increasingly ruled by a narrow secu-
rity vision at the expense of a broader development 
approach. In the long-run however, protection and 
integration programs can be more effective in lim-
iting irregular migration. Research already suggests 
that a considerable number of migrants in Morocco 
may not want to go to Europe if the conditions guar-
anteeing their integration and protection are present. 
According to a study carried out by the Université 
Internationale de Rabat, 67 percent of migrants claim 
that they would rather stay and live in Morocco than 
go to Europe.72 It is the ongoing lack of perspectives 
for socio-economic integration that makes migrants 
eventually abandon prospects of staying in Morocco.
Recommendations
Morocco’s SNIA has proved to be a useful policy inso-
far as it has enabled the country to bolster its reputa-
tion in both Africa and Europe. Yet the government’s 
inability to address migrants’ rights domestically 
may substantially limit its impact. As such, urgent 
steps need to be made to ensure the integration of 
migrants, and thus safeguard Morocco’s diplomatic 
interests abroad.
Funds directed at 
 protection programs have 
been steadily diminishing
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 - Establish a mechanism to ensure respect for 
migrants’ rights
The first step for Morocco to reclaim its credibility 
as a regional “leader” on migration and ensure the 
sustainability of the SNIA is to prevent any further 
acts of violence against migrants. Preventing violence 
not only means providing funds for training and sen-
sitization campaigns for the police, who have insuffi-
cient resources to ensure the protection of migrants’ 
rights. More efforts to fight the abuse of force and 
impunity need to be made. The government should 
establish an independent mechanism to moni-
tor respect for migrants’ rights, hosted within the 
Conseil National des Droits de l’Homme (Moroccan 
Council of Human Rights). The latter, which already 
works on safeguarding human rights in the coun-
try, could be given a mandate to specifically moni-
tor migrants’ rights, receive relevant complaints, and 
ensure their follow-up with the judiciary.
 - Expedite the adoption of a legal framework on 
migration and asylum
The migration policy enacted by Morocco since 2013 
remains incomplete without a clear legal framework 
for migration and asylum that is in line with inter-
national human rights standards. The most urgent 
reform is to revise Law 02.03 on the entry and res-
idency of foreigners in the Kingdom of Morocco, 
irregular emigration, and immigration. It is important 
to adopt a comprehensive law that grants migrants 
the same rights as nationals in terms of access to 
basic services. The second step is for the Moroccan 
government to accelerate the adoption of an asylum 
law. The government should establish a clear and 
transparent legal framework that defines the proce-
dures and modalities of granting asylum. As such, the 
BRA should be transformed into a functional body in 
charge of identifying refugees and providing them 
with the protection they need.
 - (Re)allocate funds and foreign aid to prioritize inte-
gration and protection programs
The government should be able to better channel 
public development aid into programs that can con-
tribute to the integration of migrants in the country. 
The Moroccan government and its European part-
ners should allocate more funds to protect migrants’ 
rights and ensure their integration, rather than 
spending them on border policing. The EUTF rep-
resents a cooperation instrument that can be used in 
this respect. For example, it would be advantageous 
to build on the capacity of national institutions in 
charge of providing social services to migrants, such 
as the Entraide Nationale. More funds should also be 
allocated to NGOs in contact with migrants, espe-
cially in the fields of healthcare, professional train-
ing, emergency housing, and legal aid. Morocco can 
capitalize on its own experience hosting migrants to 
better negotiate programs with international donors 
– including the EU – that are most relevant to ensur-
ing the integration of migrants in the country.
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